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ABSTRACT 
  
My dissertation examines the intersection of low-income housing programs and housing 
insecurity among the poor, taking an econometric approach to program evaluation and a 
sociological approach to examining organizational decision making in program implementation 
and its implication on economic inequality.  First, I examine longitudinal pattern of housing 
insecurity and the role of housing assistance programs in reducing it.  In the years immediately 
following the Great Recession, social program administration in the United States was extremely 
challenging.  Income and employment instability among housing assistance recipients grew, as 
did the ranks of people who qualified for assistance, and local public housing authorities were 
not necessarily prepared to accommodate this volatile situation.  Using the first two waves of the 
Michigan Recession and Recovery Study (2009-10 and 2011), a population-based sample of 
working-age adults in the three counties in the Detroit metropolitan area, I conducted a 
propensity score analysis to examine whether housing assistance recipients are less likely to 
experience housing insecurity events over follow up than income-eligible respondents who do 
not receive housing assistance.  Results suggest that housing assistance was a powerful way to 
reduce hardship in the wake of the Great Recession and provide empirical support for the 
continued support and expansion of these programs.  Second, I examine the allocation of limited 
federal resources for low-income housing programs and how it may affect stratification amongst 
the poor has received less attention.  While scholars have acknowledged that shrinking federal 
resources for low-income housing programs increase stratification among U.S. society as a 
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whole, whether the allocation of these resources exacerbates stratification amongst the poor has 
received little attention.  My study presents a comprehensive conceptual framework that 
incorporates both local discretion in program implementation and an algorithm of rationing to 
advance our understanding of the distributional outcomes of federal low-income housing 
programs.  The administrative plans local housing agencies in Michigan use to administer the 
Housing Choice Voucher program reveal two dominant forms of waitlist preference systems that 
promote the greater loss from these waitlists of applicants who are experiencing residential 
instability.  Third, I juxtapose this finding with results from the American Community Survey 
suggests that low-income housing programs are likely to purge applicants from the waitlist in 
deep poverty, rather than income-eligible applicants with higher incomes. 
 
 




My dissertation project uses multiple analytic methods to examine the implementation of 
federal low-income housing programs, using population-based survey data and primary data 
collected from local public housing authorities. My years of engagement with non-profit and 
public organizations in the fields of community development and low-income housing have 
motivated me to look at housing policy as a case study. The Housing Quality and Work 
Responsibility Act of 1998 relegated a great deal of authority for program implementation to 
local public housing authorities; thus, policy outcomes depend significantly on the decision 
making of front-line agencies implementing low-income housing programs. Local control, 
though, can pose challenges. With limited resources, local level housing agencies may engage in 
discretionary practices and shape benefit access and distribution in ways that are not equitable. 
Social justice advocates with limited resources may find it difficult to monitor program 
outcomes. My research thus provides vital information for local policy advocates by conducting 
(a) an econometric evaluation of the effectiveness of low-income housing programs in reducing 
housing insecurity and (b) a study of the local implementation of low-income housing programs, 
particularly as it relates to tenant selection.      
In Chapter II, my lead-authored article published in Social Service Review (co-authored 
with Sarah Burgard and Kristin Seefeldt) examine longitudinal pattern of housing insecurity and 
the role of housing assistance programs in reducing it. In the years immediately following the 
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Great Recession, social program administration in the United States was extremely challenging. 
Income and employment instability among housing assistance recipients grew, as did the ranks 
of people who qualified for assistance, and local public housing authorities were not necessarily 
prepared to accommodate this volatile situation. Using the first two waves of the Michigan 
Recession and Recovery Study (2009-10 and 2011), a population-based sample of working-age 
adults in the three counties in the Detroit metropolitan area, I conducted a propensity score 
analysis to examine whether housing assistance recipients are less likely to experience housing 
insecurity events over follow up than income-eligible respondents who do not receive housing 
assistance. Results suggest that housing assistance was a powerful way to reduce hardship in the 
wake of the Great Recession and provide empirical support for the continued support and 
expansion of these programs. 
In Chapter III and IV, I examine the allocation of limited federal resources for low-
income housing programs and how it may affect stratification amongst the poor. While scholars 
have acknowledged that shrinking federal resources for low-income housing programs increase 
stratification among U.S. society as a whole, whether the allocation of these resources 
exacerbates stratification amongst the poor has received little attention. Only one in four 
households eligible for participation in low-income housing programs receives assistance. This 
raises the question of what front line decisions distinguish the lucky 25% and how this rationing 
affects stratification among the poor. Local housing agencies’ implementation of low-income 
housing programs largely determines the answer to this question, but poverty scholars have 
generally treated program parameters under the discretion of local housing agencies as a priori. 
Yet a dynamic process involving multiple actors with varying incentives characterizes this 
process. In the context of extended waiting periods for federal housing assistance, rationing from 
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the waitlist of low-income housing programs can also serve as an important mechanism of 
resource allocation of limited federal housing resources, and ultimately, economic inequality. 
While random rationing would not punish the most vulnerable, more systematic rationing could 
reproduce and reinforce stratification amongst the poor if it shifted limited federal housing 
resources away from the least advantaged. 
In Chapter III, I present a comprehensive conceptual framework that incorporates both 
local discretion in program implementation and an algorithm of rationing to advance our 
understanding of the distributional outcomes of federal low-income housing programs. The 
administrative plans local housing agencies in Michigan use to administer the Housing Choice 
Voucher program reveal two dominant forms of waitlist preference systems that promote the 
greater loss from theses waitlists of applicants who are experiencing residential instability. In 
Chapter IV, I juxtapose this finding with results from the American Community Survey and 
suggest that low-income housing programs are likely to purge applicants from the waitlist who 
are in deep poverty, rather than income-eligible applicants with higher income, because they 
have no steady address. I argue that current low-income housing programs preserve and even 
deepen economic stratification amongst the poor by shifting limited federal housing resources 
away from the least advantaged.
  4 
CHAPTER II 
Housing Assistance and Housing Insecurity: A Study of Renters in Southeastern Michigan 
in the Wake of the Great Recession 
 
Introduction 
Prior studies show that housing insecurity further disadvantages those who are already 
economically marginalized (Desmond 2012b, 2016; Pattillo 2013).  Recent studies document the 
far-reaching influence of housing insecurity on the reinforcement and reproduction of 
contemporary economic inequality (Wildeman 2014).  For example, over time housing insecurity 
severely undermines stable employment (Desmond 2016, Desmond and Gershenson 2016), 
erodes informal employment networks that could reduce spells of unemployment (Ziersch and 
Arthurson 2005), and curtails access to institutional and informal supports that mitigate material 
hardship (Greenbaum et al. 2008; Keene and Geronimus 2011).  While scholarly understanding 
of the negative effects of housing insecurity on individuals is growing, there are still some 
important limitations to the evidence.  In particular, we know relatively little about the change in 
housing insecurity that individuals experience or about how programs designed to reduce 
housing insecurity affect housing histories.   
Understanding whether housing assistance helps to reduce housing insecurity for poor 
Americans is important in the contemporary context of the slow recovery from the largest 
macroeconomic recession in a generation. A key risk factor for housing insecurity is lack of 
housing affordability, and the recent recession exacerbated a long-term rise in the fraction of 
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lower-income renters living in unaffordable housing (Collinson 2011; JCHS 2011).  Moreover, 
very low-income renters appear to have not benefitted much from the economic recovery in the 
immediately following years after the official end of the Great Recession in 2009.  The number 
of severely cost-burdened households—those spending more than 50 percent of their income on 
housing—increased by 20 percent to a record high of 8.5 million US households between 2009 
and 2011 (JCHS 2011).   
Housing policies and programs directed at low-income people aim to alleviate the uneven 
distribution of access to secure housing between the poor and non-poor.  Among other things, 
housing assistance from one of these programs can directly stabilize recipients’ ability to pay for 
their housing consistently by reducing their actual rental cost (Collinson, Ellen, and Ludwig 
2016).  For example, scholars have suggested that housing vouchers are effective in reducing 
housing insecurity, including shelter use and residential instability, among families who have 
been homeless or are at risk of homelessness (Culhane 1992; Wong, Culhane and Kuhn 1997; 
Shinn et al. 1998; Gubits et al. 2015).  However, recent studies of housing insecurity among 
other populations at heightened risk, including single mothers who received welfare benefits and 
unwed urban parents, do not find significant effects of housing vouchers on subsequent housing 
insecurity (Geller and Curtis 2011; Geller and Franklin 2014; Wildeman 2014, but see Phinney 
2013).  These recent studies are valuable because they offer a view beyond the experiences of 
those with the most severe housing problems; much of the research on the determinants of 
housing insecurity and recovery focuses on those who have already been homeless (for example 
Metraux and Culhane 1999; Zlotnick, Robertson, and Lahiff 1999; Fisher et al. 2014; Parsell, 
Tomaszewski, and Phillips 2014).  However, even these newer studies capture only more 
economically disadvantaged parts of the population and they exhibit several methodological 
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limitations, including narrow measures of housing insecurity (but see Geller and Franklin 2014) 
and lack of an appropriate comparison group (i.e., most studies compare voucher recipients to all 
non-recipients, even when those who did not have a voucher may not have been eligible).  More 
studies are needed that examine the association between receiving housing assistance and 
subsequent change in housing insecurity, and that consider broader populations of renters.      
In this study, we examine the association between housing assistance receipt and change 
in housing insecurity among renters in one large metropolitan area in the wake of the Great 
Recession.  We build on prior literature by developing a comprehensive measure of housing 
insecurity that incorporates multiple types of involuntary moves and an indicator of delayed 
rental payments, broadening our scope beyond those people who are already showing evidence 
of housing insecurity to include people who are at risk of involuntary moves.  We use data from 
a population-based sample of individuals residing in southeastern Michigan that were collected 
over two survey waves in late 2009–early 2010 and in 2011, and capture the change in housing 
insecurity spanning these years.  We also examine the link between housing assistance receipt 
and change in housing insecurity while accounting for the potential influence of receiving cash-
based forms of public assistance. 
Literature Review 
MEASURING HOUSING INSECURITY  
In past research, scholars have used a variety of measures to indicate housing insecurity, 
from a simple measure separating those who are physically housed from those who are not to 
more detailed measures of housing status that capture unstable living arrangements (Eastwood 
and Birnbaum 2007; Rebholz, Drainoni, and Cabral 2009), length of stay at current residence 
(Coley et al. 2013), or recent involuntary moves (Pavao et al. 2007; Phinney et al. 2007; Reed et 
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al. 2011).  More recently, scholars have developed more comprehensive measures of housing 
instability that incorporate more than one dimension of housing insecurity (Kushel et al. 2001; 
Burgard, Seefeldt, and Zelner 2012; Rollins et al. 2012; Geller and Franklin 2014).  For example, 
Sarah Burgard and colleagues (2012) measured multiple types of housing insecurity, including 
multiple moves, cost-related moves, doubling up, homelessness, being behind on rent, eviction, 
being behind on a mortgage, and foreclosure. 
Scholars suggest that a comprehensive measure of housing insecurity that captures a wide 
spectrum of possible severity is more conceptually appropriate than measuring specific, discrete 
events (Sosin, Pilliavin, and Westerfelt 1990; Kleit, Kang, and Scally 2016).  They argue that 
housing insecurity manifests itself in the lives of low-income people as a complex, sequential 
pattern of multiple housing insecurity events over time, rather than as discrete housing events 
that befall different subgroups.  For example, less severe types of housing insecurity like a delay 
in rent payment or moving for cost reasons can precede more dramatic events like eviction and 
homelessness.  Those facing severe forms of housing insecurity also try to strategically avoid 
them by moving in with others to reduce housing cost burden (Pilkauskas, Garfinkel, and 
McLanahan 2014; Desmond 2016).  Thus, a comprehensive measure of housing insecurity 
captures those who are experiencing varying degrees of housing-related hardship at some point 
in a dynamic process, distinguishing them from others who are not insecure in any way over the 
same period.   
 Although some prior measures of housing insecurity have successfully captured its 
multiple dimensions, most have only been single point-in-time measurements, typically 
capturing whether respondents experienced any housing problems in the last year (Phinney et al. 
2007; Geller and Curtis 2011; Geller and Franklin 2014; Wildeman 2014).  If there were not 
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much year-to-year variation in housing insecurity, then there would not be much to gain by 
interviewing respondents more than once in order to capture changes in housing insecurity.  
However, housing insecurity is a dynamic experience in the lives of low-income people (Edin 
and Shaefer 2015; Desmond 2016).  For example, low-income workers often get behind on rent 
but then are able to get back on schedule, as their employment status and work hours fluctuate.  
Measuring housing insecurity at only one point in time would miss this kind of volatility.  
Especially during and following economic recessions, the oscillation of the business cycle likely 
generates instability in employment status and working hours that could create rapid change in 
housing insecurity over relatively short intervals.  Measuring housing insecurity over multiple 
time points may thus better capture important variation in such insecurity across low-income 
renters. 
Recognizing that housing insecurity is dynamic, housing scholars have developed the 
concept of the housing pathway or career to examine how work and family domains (e.g., labor 
market status or relationship dynamics) influence housing insecurity.  For example, William 
Clark, Marinus Deurloo, and Frans Dieleman (2003) examine the change in housing tenure and 
affordability over the entire life course and differential trajectories of tenure and affordability 
across income levels.  One common housing career shows a pattern of upward mobility toward a 
stage of home ownership or higher-priced rental dwellings, while another distinctive housing 
career ends in low-priced rental units for those with very low household incomes and negative 
income growth (Clark et al. 2003).  Although housing researchers have developed multiple 
concepts to capture longitudinal housing trajectories that unfold over the life course (May 2000; 
Clark et al. 2003; Skobba 2016), they have rarely examined relatively short-term housing 
trajectories or how they are influenced by the receipt of housing assistance. This limits our 
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ability to understand the volatility of the lives of low-income renters and its implications for 
housing assistance.  One exception is a study of a small sample of low-income mothers in a large 
Midwestern metropolitan area who reported on the type and duration of each housing 
accommodation they had experienced since they began living independently (Skobba 2016).  
Kim Skobba (2016) shows that receipt of a housing voucher partially alleviated housing 
insecurity induced by precarious employment and relationship disruption among these low-
income renters.  We build on this past evidence by using a larger survey sample of adults who 
represent the working-aged population in a large metropolitan area and by generating measures 
of housing insecurity at two time points and considering the change between them, using detailed 
data that capture an array of housing insecurity experiences.  We also assess the association 
between housing assistance receipt and change in housing insecurity, and distinguish an 
appropriate comparison group of income-eligible non-recipients whose demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics are otherwise similar to those of housing assistance recipients. 
HOUSING ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AND HOUSING INSECURITY OVER TIME  
The United States operates many different types of housing assistance programs targeted 
to different populations.  In general, recipients of housing assistance live in public housing or 
privately owned units that have received federal subsidies, or they receive a voucher to use on 
the housing market.  From the 1930s through the early 1970s, public housing built and operated 
by local public housing authorities (PHAs) was the dominant form of low-income targeted 
housing assistance.  However, from the 1960s to the early 1980s, the federal government 
executed long-term contacts with for-profit and non-profit developers and built privately owned 
subsidized housing, which guarantees subsidies and imposes affordability restrictions on a 
certain number of units for a period of up to 30 years.  The demolition of distressed public 
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housing developments has gradually decreased the importance of public housing as a means of 
federal low-income housing assistance and has resulted in the reduction of total public housing 
stock by about 300,000 units over the past 20 years.  Currently, the Housing Choice Voucher 
(HCV) program and privately owned subsidized housing (e.g., Section 8 Project-Based Rental 
Assistance [PBRA]), are the largest programs, assisting more than 3 million households (2 
million through HCV; Collinson et al. 2016).      
The HCV program in the United States (formerly known as the Section 8 housing 
voucher program) was established after the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974.  
Housing vouchers aim to reduce housing insecurity among recipients by providing a significant 
amount of subsidy for rental payments.  Voucher recipients contribute 30 percent of their income 
to housing costs, and the HCV program subsidizes the difference between that amount and the 
total allowed cost of rent, set annually by the US Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) as the Fair Market Rate (FMR), and further locally adjusted by public 
housing authorities (PHAs; HUD 2001).  HUD requires local PHAs to set payment standards 
between 90 and 110 percent of the FMR for each unit size.  PHAs can also set different payment 
standards for different parts of the FMR area.  The FMR in 2010 for the metropolitan Detroit 
area, where respondents in our sample resided, was $796 for a two-bedroom unit.  A hypothetical 
family of three whose income was at the upper bound of the extremely low income category 
($18,850 for the metropolitan Detroit area in 2010) was thus expected to contribute 30 percent of 
that monthly income ($18,850 / 12 * 0.3 = $471.25 per month) toward rent.  Their subsidy would 
not exceed the difference between the payment standard and 30 percent of their monthly income, 
so their maximum amount of subsidy in this scenario would be about $320 ($796 - $471.25).  
Since voucher recipients pay less out of pocket toward rent each month due to the subsidy, they 
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are presumably less likely to fall behind on rent, be evicted or become homeless, or experience 
other forms of housing insecurity compared to their counterparts who are income eligible but not 
receiving a subsidy. Further, if a recipient’s income drops, the subsidy amount is adjusted 
upward, making it easier for recipients to weather income shocks than otherwise similar 
individuals not receiving assistance. 
Section 8 Project-Based Rental Assistance (PBRA) is the largest project-based rental 
assistance program in the United States and serves more than 1.2 million low-income 
households.  PBRA is tied to particular housing developments, and families cannot retain their 
rental assistance when they move to new locations.  HUD makes an annual contract with private 
property owners to rent some or all of the units in the development to low-income households at 
an affordable rent.  PBRA also provides a housing subsidy to the owner of the units that fills the 
gap between 30 percent of household income and the cost for operating and managing the 
contracted units.  Although income eligibility for PBRA is set at having an income below 80 
percent of Area Median Income (AMI), the median family income for an area estimated annually 
by HUD, federal regulation mandates that 40 percent of assisted units in the development are 
allocated to very low-income households (i.e., income below 50 percent of AMI).  
Although the substantial amount of subsidy that housing assistance programs provide 
should positively shape recipients’ housing security patterns, there is still limited evidence 
showing whether having housing assistance prevents recipients from developing new housing 
problems.  On the one hand, because the subsidy is substantial, housing assistance recipients 
would appear to be protected from developing housing problems and would seem more likely to 
get out of trouble compared to those with similar resources but no housing assistance.  However, 
there may be a further issue to consider that conditions the advantage of housing assistance 
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recipients.  The way that the HCV and PBRA system is structured means that program responses 
to recipients’ income changes could actually generate fluctuations in their housing security.  
Some scholars suggest that the housing assistance system only provides a limited safety net from 
unstable employment and associated income volatility during recessionary hard times (Ellen and 
O’Flaherty 2007; Collinson et al. 2016).  This is because local public housing authorities 
annually recalculate the monthly subsidy for families by subtracting 30 percent of the estimated 
monthly income of voucher recipients from their total housing cost.  Inaccurate annual income 
projections, which are more common for extremely low-income persons (e.g., due to unstable 
working hours), could mean that in reality the financial burden imposed by their monthly 
contribution of rent might vary from month to month.  In this scenario, a given month’s rent 
contribution could temporarily effectively increase to more than 30 percent of a housing 
assistance recipient’s actual income that month.1  Coupled with a low level of personal savings 
(Seefeldt 2015), as well as delays in processing changes to other benefits a recipient might 
receive (Seefeldt forthcoming), the structural lag in the housing assistance system’s response to a 
given recipient’s income decline might mean that they have to delay rent payments and face 
eviction.  Moreover, housing assistance recipients cannot legally use the cost-sharing strategy of 
doubling up (Ellen and O’Flaherty 2007), which is relatively common among low-income 
                                                 
1. In the case of income decline, prompt reporting of income change can significantly benefit recipients if it means 
they will be able to reduce their contribution to housing costs.  However, a legal case study about conflict over the 
adjusted income calculation between voucher recipient and PHAs documents possibly significant administrative delay 
in income adjustment and its potential effect on housing security of recipients (Daniels v. Housing Auth. Of Prince 
George's City., 940 F. Supp. 2d 248 [Dist. Ct. D. Md. 2013]).  Also, the lagged response of PHAs is even more critical 
in relation to housing insecurity when there is no emergency safety net (e.g., emergency fund for housing assistance 
recipients to prevent eviction from delayed rental payment) for housing assistance recipients (Ross and Pelletiere 
2014). 
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families (Pilkauskas et al. 2014), although levels of enforcement of this rule may vary across 
local PHAs.  For these reasons, it is possible that housing assistance recipients may not be more 
protected from volatility in their housing security than income-eligible families not receiving 
housing assistance. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSEHOLDS SERVED AND THE IMPORTANCE OF AN APPROPRIATE 
REFERENCE GROUP 
Housing assistance recipients are demographically and socioeconomically distinct.  To 
access the association between housing assistance receipt and housing insecurity over time, it is 
critical to obtain a comparison group with a set of characteristics similar to those of housing 
assistance recipients.  Failure to account for factors that predict both housing assistance receipt 
and housing insecurity, such as income, participation in other means-tested social programs, or 
some key demographic characteristics, may lead to an overestimate of the influence of housing 
assistance.  One of the eligibility criterion for participation in housing assistance program is the 
applicant’s income level in relation to AMI.  In order to be income eligible for HCV, for 
example, an applicant family’s income should be below 50 percent of the annually updated AMI 
after adjusting for family size, with some exceptional cases allowed to have incomes up to 80 
percent of the AMI.  However, housing assistance is not an entitlement in the United States, and 
in the case of housing voucher programs, only one-fourth of income-eligible families actually 
receive vouchers (Collinson et al. 2016).  Thus, there are many income-eligible non-recipients 
who could plausibly be used as a comparison group in examining the influence of housing 
assistance on housing insecurity changes.  However, previous studies generally have compared 
housing assistance recipients to all non-recipients in evaluating the effect of housing assistance 
on housing insecurity (Geller and Curtis 2011; Geller and Franklin 2014; Wildeman 2014), with 
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the exception of experimental studies that have sampled respondents from among people who 
were participating in other means-tested social programs (Wood and Rangarajan 2004; Wood, 
Turnham, and Mills 2008).  Past studies have partially addressed income differences between 
recipients and non-recipients by including a measure of income in their models, but this may not 
be sufficient to create an appropriate comparison.   
Additionally, it is reasonable to presume that many housing assistance recipients are also 
eligible for and participate in other means-tested social programs since they meet the income-
eligibility requirement for housing assistance programs.  Means-tested benefit programs are a 
critical income stabilizer for the very low-income population, and help low-income people cope 
with typical day-to-day financial challenges, as well as with more serious recessionary hard 
times, since those with very low incomes have less access to credit and support from family 
(Harknett and Hartnett 2011; Desmond 2012a; Seefeldt 2015).  Receipt of other means-tested 
benefits could also reduce housing insecurity by decreasing the chance of having an income 
shock and associated housing problems, including delayed rent payment, eviction, or 
homelessness (O’Flaherty 2009).  In order to evaluate the influence of housing assistance alone 
rather than the total influence of multiple means-tested social programs on housing insecurity 
trajectories, we adjust for cash assistance receipt in our analyses. 
Finally, housing assistance recipients are demographically different from those who do 
not receive housing assistance.  Using a population-based sample of urban, low-income 
individuals, researchers find that while having a larger number of children is positively 
associated with having voucher-based housing assistance, being married reduces that likelihood 
(Park, Fertig, and Metraux 2014).  Barbara Sard and Thyria Alvarez-Sánchez (2011) document 
demographic characteristics of HCV recipients that could make their risk of housing insecurity 
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different from that experienced by non-recipients.  Although the share of vouchers going to 
families with children declined from 2000 to 2010, 52 percent of voucher households have 
children, while more than 20 percent of voucher recipients are elderly.  To address these factors, 
we adjust for a set of demographic variables including marital status, number of children, and 
age, and also adjust for income and match on income eligibility.   
Data and Method 
DATA  
We use the first two waves of the Michigan Recession and Recovery Study (MRRS), a 
stratified, random sample of working-aged adults drawn from the general population of the three 
counties (Macomb, Oakland, and Wayne) surrounding Detroit. We conducted wave 1 interviews 
between October 2009 and April 2010 with 914 respondents, with a response rate of 82.8 
percent.  We re-interviewed 847 respondents between April and August of 2011, with a response 
rate of 94 percent of those who completed wave 1 interviews.  We limit our analytic sample to 
those who identified as renters or “others” (those who were not paying rent and did not have a 
mortgage or own their home; N = 421), and excluded four cases with missing data on 
independent and dependent variables used in multivariable analyses.  This yields an analytic 
sample of 417.  
The Detroit-Warren-Livonia Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), from which our 
sample is drawn, had a high rental vacancy rate of 17.7 percent compared to the median of 9.1 
percent among the 75 largest US MSAs (HUD 2015a).  The Detroit metropolitan area is 
somewhat unique in that it has both high unemployment and a higher-than-average proportion of 
high-interest mortgages, which led to a higher foreclosure rate compared to other US MSAs 
during the recent recession (Dwyer and Lassus 2015).  The high rental vacancy rate in our study 
  16 
area, however, could have absorbed some part of the foreclosure shock on the rental housing 
market.  It is also noteworthy that there is considerable variation in the rental vacancy rate across 
the three counties in which our respondents resided.  Wayne County, where 91.1 percent of 
housing assistance recipients in our study resided, had a vacancy rate of 14.5 percent, while 
Macomb and Oakland Counties had much lower rates at 7.0 percent and 8.3 percent, respectively 
(HUD 2015a).  The HCV program and PBRA comprise more than half of all the HUD programs 
in Wayne county (43.3 percent and 33.6 percent, respectively), followed by public housing (15.8 
percent), which is similar to the national level.  HUD (2015b) data indicates that the percentage 
of blacks receiving any type of HUD program assistance was 78 while the percentage was 85 
percent when we only look at HCV recipients.  For project-based rental assistance, the 
percentage of blacks was lower, at 70 percent (national averages were 43 percent, 47 percent, 
and 28 percent, respectively).        
MEASURES 
Dependent Variables 
At wave 1, we asked about residential moves in the year prior and at the wave 2 interview 
we asked about moves between wave 1 and wave 2 (representing a period of about 17 months on 
average), as well as about reasons respondents gave for moving and about other types of housing 
insecurity experiences.  We created a comprehensive measure of housing insecurity, using a 
detailed set of questions about housing and residential mobility (see table A1 in the appendix).  
Because rates of any one type of housing insecurity problem were low, as this is a population-
based sample and not a sample of very disadvantaged people, we decided to aggregate in order to 
capture all individuals facing housing problems of a relatively serious nature, so that we could 
conduct multivariable analysis.  In constructing this housing insecurity measure, we focused on 
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separating what seemed to be voluntary from what apparently were involuntary residential 
moves (involuntary moves were defined as those that appear to have occurred for cost reasons), 
and including information about whether respondents were behind on rent as an additional 
indicator of risk for housing insecurity, since it was likely caused by limited financial resources.  
At each wave, we classified respondents as housing insecure if they reported any moves for cost 
reasons; had completed foreclosure (only at wave 2, since we only considered renters at wave 1 
but a small number became homeowners between waves); had experienced eviction, 
homelessness, or moving in with others to share expenses; or were behind on rent, and as 
housing secure otherwise.  
Key Predictors 
In order to examine the difference in housing insecurity over both waves between 
housing assistance recipients and their income-eligible non-recipient counterparts, while 
separating out income-ineligible respondents, we created a measure that combines information 
on housing assistance status and the federal income eligibility criterion of 50 percent of AMI.  
MRRS respondents were asked the following question about housing assistance status at wave 1: 
“Do you get any help on the monthly rent for this apartment or house from any federal, state, or 
city government housing programs, including any federal Section 8 certificate or voucher?”  To 
narrow down possible types of housing assistance they were receiving, we retrieved physical 
addresses of subsidized housing stock from the Michigan State Housing Development Authority 
(MSHDA) website and compared those with respondents’ residential addresses at wave 1.  This 
comparison suggested that our interview question on housing assistance status captured only 
non-public housing residents.   
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HUD annually estimates the median family income for an area and adjusts that amount 
for different family sizes.  We used AMI in 2008 for the Detroit-Warren-Livonia MSA, which 
includes all three counties in our sample.  The reference category in our analyses is housing 
assistance non-recipients who meet the eligibility criterion of household income below AMI 50 
percent.  Thus, when we compare housing assistance recipients with this reference category, we 
can estimate the extent to which having housing assistance is related to subsequent housing 
insecurity in a population of similar individuals.  When respondents with household incomes 
above AMI 50 percent are compared with the reference group, we can estimate the extent to 
which income below or above AMI 50 percent influences subsequent housing insecurity among 
those not receiving housing assistance. 
Control Variables 
Based on the prior literature, we adjusted for several variables in multivariable analysis, 
including receipt of any other social program (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
[TANF], Supplemental Security Income [SSI], or Unemployment Insurance [UI]) 2, race (black 
versus non-black), marital status (married or not), number of children, age, education level (more 
than high school versus high school or less), and county of residence (Wayne versus other). 
Adjusting for these characteristics helps to address potential selection bias in estimating the 
association between having housing assistance and experiencing housing insecurity between 
waves 1 and 2 of the MRRS.  In order to control for varying durations between survey waves for 
                                                 
2. 39 percent of housing assistance recipients participated in SSI, followed by TANF (31 percent), and UI (11 
percent).  Income-eligible non-recipients showed a similar pattern, but with a much lower percentage of TANF 
participation: SSI (26 percent) was followed by UI (15 percent), and TANF (9 percent).  Not surprisingly, none of 
the income-ineligible respondents received TANF and only a small percentage received UI (12 percent) or SSI (7 
percent).     
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different respondents, we included duration in months between wave 1 and wave 2 as a 
continuous variable.  Additionally, some of those who reported receiving housing assistance at 
wave 1 of the MRRS reported not receiving it at wave 2 (15 of 69), and we coded these 
respondents as having lost housing assistance, while others who did not report housing assistance 
at wave 1 reported having it at wave 2 (14 respondents), and we coded them as having gained 
housing assistance at wave 2.     
ANALYTIC STRATEGY 
We first conducted descriptive analyses to examine whether characteristics of housing 
assistance recipients differ from those of income-eligible non-recipients or those who are not 
eligible and do not receive housing assistance, and to explore the composition and pattern of 
housing insecurity at wave 1 and wave 2 of the MRRS.  Afterward, we examined the prevalence 
of each type of housing insecurity by income eligibility and housing assistance receipt.  We then 
estimated two multivariable models predicting housing insecurity at wave 2, while controlling 
for wave 1 housing insecurity.  We used wave 2 weights in all analyses to adjust for the wave 1 
sampling design and attrition by wave 2.   
We first estimated a logistic regression model predicting housing insecurity problems at 
wave 2.  In the second model, we estimated the association between having housing assistance 
and housing insecurity at wave 2 using propensity score methods.  When trying to draw causal 
inference using observational data, the simple comparison of treatment group and control group 
can be problematic when the distribution of covariates associated with the outcome varies for 
treatment and control groups (Morgan and Winship 2015), here, housing assistance recipients 
versus income-eligible non-recipients.  To address imbalance in covariates between the two 
groups in observational studies, one can match respondents who are similar on their observed 
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characteristics, but who differ on the treatment variable, and then assess whether having housing 
assistance was associated with a differential outcome over follow up.  Since our major focus is 
on the comparison between voucher recipients and income-eligible non-recipients, we have 
estimated the average causal effect of housing assistance receipt on housing insecurity at wave 2, 
considering only respondents whose household income meets the income eligibility criterion.   
Since we have a relatively small number of cases, we have used propensity score 
weighting, which reweights all the observations in our analytic sample with a propensity weight 
(Busso, DiNardo, and McCrary 2014).  Propensity score weighting produces unbiased estimates 
when treatment selection depends on covariates included in the propensity score model (Morgan 
and Winship 2015).  Among other contributing factors to receiving a housing voucher, federally 
mandated income targeting can be critical (AMI below 30 percent).  We have included a 
dichotomous variable indicating whether a respondent’s income is below AMI 30 percent in the 
propensity score model predicting housing assistance receipt.  We also include the same set of 
demographic variables as in the earlier regression models, including respondent’s race, marital 
status, number of children, age, education, and other social program participation.  To further 
reduce bias, previous literature also recommends including variables related to the outcome, even 
when they are not associated with treatment selection, since the purpose of the propensity score 
approach is to control imbalance in covariates associated with outcome (Brookhart et al. 2006; 
Austin 2011).  Thus, we have also included months elapsed between waves of the MRRS in the 
propensity score model.  We also included survey weights as a predictor in the propensity score 
model since they can additionally capture place of residence, demographic characteristics, and 
variables related to the probability of survey response (DuGoff, Schuler, and Stuart 2014).    
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We first tried commonly used propensity weights, called inverse-probability treatment 
weights (IPTW), which give the inverse of the propensity score to a treated respondents and the 
inverse of one minus the propensity score to observations in the comparison group.  However, 
the IPTW not only created extremely high values of propensity score weights for some 
respondents, which is one of the caveats in IPTW (Morgan and Winship 2015), but, more 
importantly, significant imbalances in covariates remained after weighting.  Thus, instead of 
IPTW we have used overlap weights recommended by Fan Li, Kari Morgan, and Alan Zaslavsky 
(2016).  The overlap weight of one minus the propensity score is assigned to a treated respondent 
and the propensity score itself is assigned to respondents in the comparison group.  Weighted 
means of covariates in the outcome model suggest a significant reduction in imbalance across 
covariates.  We multiplied these overlap weights with the survey weight before using them in the 
propensity score weighted model so that our results could be generalized to the population of 
working-age adults in our study area (DuGoff et al. 2014).  These procedures address potential 
confounding issues while still retaining the representativeness of the population-representative 
data.     
In order to illustrate the practical significance of coefficients from these two different 
multivariable models, we also present the average marginal effect (AME) for each independent 
variable.  Using the example of the black race coefficient, these AMEs were generated by first 
calculating a predicted probability for each respondent while treating them as though they were 
black, and then non-black, while leaving all other independent variables at their actual values.  
Afterward, we estimated the average marginal effect by averaging the difference between the 
two predicted probabilities for each respondent (individual-level marginal effect) across all 
respondents (Williams 2012).   
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Results 
Table 1 presents percentages or means for characteristics of the sample overall in the first 
column, and then compares the characteristics of housing assistance recipients at wave 1 of the 
MRRS with those of income-eligible non-recipients in the middle column and income-ineligible  
TABLE 2-1.  Population-weighted Characteristics of Analytic Sample from the MRRS, Overall and 














Number of observations       417        198         69  150 
W1 SES and demographics     
     R is black (%) 39.8 54.0 96.0*** 20.3** 
     R is married (%) 25.2 22.6 7.8 29.8 
     Number of children in household 1.0 1.1 1.5 0.8 
     R's age (in years) 35.3 35.8 39.8 34.2 
     R has some college experience (%) 53.5 36.9 46.9 68.5*** 
W1 other social program participation 33.4 45.3 73.1** 18.0** 
Months between waves 17.3 17.5 17.0 17.2 
W1 housing insecurity (%) 39.1 43.6 36.6 35.6 
Housing assistance status change (%)     
     Lost housing assistance − − 21.7 − 
     Gained housing assistance − 6.1 − 1.3 
Wayne County resident (%) 55.2 68.1 91.1* 39.5* 
Note.—Using t-tests, we examined whether differences in these characteristics between income-
eligible non-recipients and income-eligible recipients (or income ineligible non-recipients) are 
statistically significant. We do not have information about income eligibility at the time when 
respondents started to receive housing assistance, but measured it at their baseline interview. 
Participants in programs like the Housing Choice Voucher program are allowed to keep receiving 
assistance as long as their income does not exceed 80 percent of Area Median Income (AMI).  In our 
data, three housing assistance recipients had incomes between 50-80 percent of AMI at baseline and 
reported receiving housing assistance, and we included them in the category of income-eligible 
housing assistance recipients. MRRS = Michigan Recession and Recovery Study, W1 = wave 1 of the 
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non-recipients in the final column.  We present p-values for t-tests of differences between 
groups, with significance denoted with asterisks, and income-eligible non-recipients as the 
reference group.  Table 1 shows that housing assistance recipients were disproportionately likely 
to be African American (96 percent compared to 54 percent of income-eligible non-recipients).  
They were more likely to participate in other social programs than income eligible non-recipients 
(73 percent versus 45 percent) and were more likely to reside in Wayne County (91 percent 
versus 68 percent).      
Figure 2-1 shows the percentage of respondents who had experienced housing insecurity 
by type of housing insecurity problem.  At wave 1, about 39 percent of respondents were 
experiencing or had recently experienced any of the problems comprising our housing insecurity 
indicator, with being behind rent the most common (18 percent), followed by moving in with 
others (15 percent), moving due to cost (14 percent), homelessness (4 percent), and eviction (3 
percent).  At the wave 2 interview, the percentage of respondents who had any housing problems 
fell to 34 percent, but the dip was not statistically significant, nor were there statistically 
significant changes in the prevalence of any specific housing problems.  
The cross-wave comparison of the prevalence of housing problems in figure 2-1 
summarizes housing insecurity at two points in time.  An individual-level prospective view 
reveals more dynamic patterns of housing insecurity.  Figure 2-2 shows that in the overall 
analytic sample, 66 percent of respondents reported either persistent housing insecurity 
(insecure-insecure category, 19 percent) or consistent security (secure-secure category, 47 
percent) from wave 1 to wave 2.  However, 15 percent of respondents without housing insecurity 
at wave 1 developed insecurity by wave 2 (secure-insecure category), and 20 percent of  
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FIGURE 2-1.  Population-weighted Prevalence of Each Type of Housing Insecurity (n=417)  
Note 1. The percentage reported in the center of 95% Confidence Interval (CI) is a point-estimate 
of the prevalence of each type of housing insecurity.  Nine percent of respondents (n=36) had 
become homeowners by the follow-up interview; they were asked the same set of housing 
insecurity-related questions except about eviction and being behind on rent, because they were no 
longer eligible for those problems.  Instead, they were asked about being behind on mortgage in 
the last year.  Only renters or other non-homeowners were asked about eviction at the follow-up 
interview.     
Note 2. Wave 1 housing insecurity captures respondents’ statuses one year prior to the interview 
conducted between October 2009 and April 2010.  Thus, wave 1 housing insecurity information 
was gathered in the period several months before and after the official end of the Great 
Recession.  Wave 2 housing insecurity captures the period between the baseline and follow-up 
interviews, with the average length of 17.3 months. 
Note 3. “Any Housing Insecurity” indicates respondents who reported any of the specific 
problems illustrated in the figure.      
 
respondents who were insecure at wave 1 had resolved those problems by wave 2 (insecure-
secure category).  When we break down the overall sample by income eligibility and housing 
assistance status, we can see the following patterns in the housing insecurity change among the 
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three groups.  In the income-eligible, non-recipient group (shown in the second set of columns in 
figure 2), 36 percent of respondents had avoided housing insecurity over the entire period, and 




FIGURE 2-2.  Typologies of Stability or Change in Housing Insecurity between Baseline and 
Wave Two, Overall and by Income-eligibility and Housing Assistance Status (n=417) 
Note 1. The percentage reported in the center of 95% Confidence Interval (CI) is a point-
estimate of the prevalence of housing insecurity.   
Note 2. The Secure-Secure category indicates those were not housing insecure near the official 
end of the Great Recession in June 2009 and who did not experience housing insecurity over 
follow up.  Respondents in the Secure-Insecure category did not have housing insecurity at 
baseline, but developed it in the post-recession period.  The Insecure-Secure category includes 
respondents who had experienced housing insecurity problems near the end of the Great 
Recession, but resolved those housing problems in the follow-up period. The Insecure-Insecure 
category includes those who reported housing insecurity at baseline and at follow-up. 
In the housing assistance recipient group (shown in the third set of columns), 53 percent of 
respondents were in the secure-secure category, followed by the insecure-secure category (19 
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percent), the insecure-insecure category (18 percent), and the secure-insecure category (11 
percent).  Respondents whose income made them ineligible for federal housing assistance 
showed a pattern generally similar to that of the housing assistance recipients.       
Figure 2-3 provides information on the association of our key independent variable of 
income eligibility and housing assistance receipt, and each type of housing insecurity at wave 2 
that is included in our aggregated measure used in the main analysis.  Severe forms of housing 
insecurity, including eviction and homelessness, were rare in our population-based sample of 
renters, resulting in non-significant differences in the point estimates, with large confidence 
intervals across the three subgroups.   
 
FIGURE 2-3.  Population-weighted Prevalence of Each Type of Housing Insecurity by Income 
Eligibility and Housing Assistance receipt 
Note. The percentage reported in the center of 95% Confidence Interval (CI) is a point-estimate 
of the prevalence of each type of housing insecurity. 
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Figure 2-3 also shows that the point estimate of the aggregated measure of any housing 
insecurity was not significantly different for housing assistance recipients and income-eligible 
non-recipients before controlling other covariates that  
 
FIGURE 2-4.  Population-weighted Prevalence of Each Type of Housing Insecurity by Income 
Eligibility and Housing Assistance receipt 
Note. The percentage reported in the center of 95% Confidence Interval (CI) is a point-estimate 
of the prevalence of each type of housing insecurity. 
 
are potentially associated with housing assistance receipt.  Respondents who were not income 
eligible for housing assistance had a significantly lower rate of overall housing insecurity than 
both income-eligible non-recipients and housing assistance recipients. 
In table 2-2, we present coefficients, standard errors, and average marginal effects from 
logistic regressions and a propensity score model.  Results for the first model show that housing 
assistance receipt reduced the likelihood of housing insecurity at wave 2.  The average marginal 
effect suggests that housing assistance recipients were about 22.3 percent less likely to 
experience housing insecurity at wave 2, compared to income-eligible non-recipients, net of  
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TABLE 2-2.  Coefficients, Standard Errors and Average Marginal Effect (AME) from Logistic 
Regression or Propensity Score Models Predicting Housing Insecurity Problems over Follow-up 
 Any Housing Insecurity Problems over Follow-up  
Logistic Model  Propensity Score Model 
 Coef.  SE AME  Coef. SE AME 
Income eligibility / housing assistance         
(reference = income-eligible non-recipients)         
     Housing assistance recipients  −1.635** .490 −.223  −1.605** .443 −.310 
     Not income-eligible  −.692 .442 −.140  − − − 
W1 SES and demographic characteristics        
Black .537 .498 .133  .198 .372 .037 
     Married .415 .512 .080  −.256 .676 −.048 
     Number of children .301* .133 .057  .283† .142 .053 
     Age (in years, centered) .001 .012 .000  −.011 .018 −.002 
    More than high school education −.097 .262 −.034  .421 .244 .079 
W1 other social program participation .209 .398 .034  .413 .349 .077 
Month elapsed between waves (centered) .112 .139 −.022  −.067 .177 −.013 
W1 housing insecurity .980** .266 .190  1.421** .388 .290 
Housing assistance change over follow-up         
Lost housing assistance 1.102† .540 .213  .962† .555 .180 
Gained housing assistance  −.169 .755 −.016  −1.190 .875 −.204 
Constant −1.689** .506   −1.338* .581  




other characteristics adjusted for in the model.  This first model also reveals that losing housing 
assistance is associated with an increased chance of experiencing housing insecurity problems at 
wave 2 of 21.3 percent (based on the average marginal effects).  This first model also shows that 
number of children and wave 1 housing insecurity were positively associated with housing 
insecurity at wave 2.  In the second set of columns, results for the propensity score model further 
confirm our finding for a significant protective influence of housing assistance receipt against 
housing insecurity at wave 2.  Housing assistance recipients were about 31.0 percent less likely 
to experience housing insecurity problems at wave 2 when compared to their income-eligible 
non-recipients when using the propensity score approach.       
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We conducted a set of additional sensitivity analyses to assess the robustness of these 
results.  Respondents with housing assistance could have more serious housing insecurity 
problems and be at greater risk of future insecurity than their income-eligible counterparts, since 
some housing assistance programs specifically target those who are experiencing a high level of  
housing insecurity with indicators of ever having been evicted or foreclosed upon (if they had 
ever owned a home), and our results were substantively unchanged.  We also estimated a logistic 
regression model with an interaction between housing assistance receipt category and housing 
insecurity at wave 1 and distinguished, for example, respondents who were stably insecure from 
those who developed new housing insecurity at wave 2.  Results show that regardless of wave 1 
housing insecurity, housing assistance receipt is associated with a reduced likelihood of housing 
insecurity at wave 2.  It is also plausible that changes in characteristics and experiences occurring 
between wave 1 and wave 2 were the cause of divergence in housing insecurity at wave 2 for 
recipients and income-eligible non-recipients, rather than housing assistance receipt.  To capture 
the influence of a financial shock, we added an indicator of more than a 25 percent decrease in 
the respondent’s household’s income-to-needs ratio, but substantive results remained the same.   
The household income of housing assistance recipients was significantly lower than that 
of their income-eligible non-recipient counterparts.  When we used a lower income cutoff to 
construct the comparison group of income-eligible non-recipients, the coefficients associated 
with receipt of housing assistance increased slightly, suggesting that our estimate of the influence 
of housing assistance on housing insecurity may be conservative.  Results were also robust to an 
alternative calculation of household income eligibility that accounted for childcare costs, and to a 
broader measure of social program participation that included participation in Supplementary 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), a program that could save money on food-related 
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consumption and leave more funds for rental payments.  Lastly, we conducted an additional 
analysis that examined whether the receipt of housing assistance and income eligibility for 
assistance predicted attrition, using a model predicting whether respondents participated at wave 
2 or not with all covariates included in the main analytic model.  We find no significant 
difference in the likelihood of attrition among income-eligible non-recipients, housing assistance 
recipients, and income ineligible respondents.  Additionally, wave 1 housing insecurity did not 
significantly predict attrition.         
Discussion 
We examine the association between housing assistance and subsequent housing 
insecurity among renters and other non-owners in the Detroit Metropolitan region in the years 
immediately following the Great Recession of 2007–09.  Our findings suggest that having 
housing assistance is associated with a significantly lower risk of housing insecurity over about 
17 months of follow up, when comparing recipients to their income-eligible non-recipient 
counterparts, and estimates are similar across different model specification and modeling 
approaches.  
While it is important to consider these results in light of the previous literature, it is 
challenging to compare our results directly to findings from previous population-based studies on 
housing insecurity. The influence of housing assistance on subsequent housing insecurity is not 
the central question of many prior studies, which primarily focus on examining housing 
insecurity either in the context of mass incarceration (Geller and Curtis 2011; Geller and 
Franklin 2014; Wildeman 2014) or welfare reform (Phinney 2013).  Federal housing assistance, 
whether public housing residence or receipt of a housing voucher, is included as a control 
variable in some of these prior studies (Geller and Curtis 2011; Geller and Franklin 2014; 
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Wildeman 2014) or is mentioned conceptually as one of the protective factors contributing to 
housing security among the low-income population (Phinney 2013).  However, none of those 
studies developed and applied a sophisticated methodology to estimate the relationship between 
housing assistance receipt housing insecurity.  
Previous population-based studies that have focused on housing insecurity have used 
narrower measures, such as homelessness (Wildeman 2014) or residential mobility (Phinney 
2013).  A few prior studies have used more comprehensive measures of housing insecurity, 
similar to the approach used in our study (Geller and Curtis 2011; Geller and Franklin 2014). In 
particular, Amanda Geller and Allyson Franklin (2014) and Amanda Geller and Marah Curtis 
(2011) studied housing insecurity four years after respondents were asked whether they were 
receiving any federal housing assistance. They find that housing assistance is not associated with 
housing insecurity at follow-up.  It is important to consider that the median length of time people 
receive housing assistance is around five years (Kucheva 2012), and there might have been a 
very low percentage of respondents who retained housing assistance from their baseline 
interview over the entire period of follow up in these studies.  Our finding of a significant 
protective influence of housing assistance receipt may differ from the weaker findings of past 
studies because of a more appropriate reference group and our relatively short follow-up period, 
which resulted in potentially higher retention of housing assistance by our respondents over 
follow up than in prior studies with longer follow-up periods.   
In estimating the association between housing assistance and subsequent housing 
insecurity, we addressed several methodological limitations of prior population-based studies.  
First, and most importantly, we use income-eligible non-recipients as a comparison group, rather 
than simply adjusting for income differences.  Second, we establish that the differential 
  32 
likelihood of housing insecurity over follow up for housing assistance recipients and non-
recipients is not a function of differential levels of cash assistance receipt across groups, or of 
changes in housing assistance receipt over follow up.  Propensity score modeling yields very 
consistent findings to the more conventional regression model results, and provides a more 
explicit attempt to account for differences in the characteristics of recipients and non-recipients 
that could drive both housing assistance receipt and subsequent housing insecurity. 
Despite these advances, our results should be considered in the context of several 
limitations.  Previous research has identified limitations of self-reported data on program 
participation.  Under-reporting of housing assistance receipt could lead us to underestimate its 
positive influence because respondents who had such assistance but did not report it would be 
included in the control group, which could decrease overall housing insecurity in the control 
group, thereby reducing the gap in outcomes between those with and without assistance.  Also, 
recipients may have failed to report exactly what types of housing assistance they received 
(Shroder 2002).  We used the residential addresses of respondents to verify that none were living 
in public housing, but were not able to further differentiate project-based housing vouchers from 
tenant-based ones.  Also, although HCVs are the most common form of housing vouchers 
administered by local PHAs, it is also plausible that respondents may have received housing 
assistance from other sources (e.g., PBRA or the HUD Veteran Affairs Supportive Housing 
Program) that have different regulations, such as different income-eligibility criteria.  
Our study is also limited by our use of typical survey items that ask about housing 
problems in the last year, rather than asking about shorter intervals and more detail, given the 
empirically documented within-year fluctuation in income among low-income people (Bania and 
Leete 2009; Hannagan and Morduch 2015).  However, even when housing assistance does not 
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fully mitigate the negative influence of monthly income fluctuation on housing security for an 
extended period of time, housing assistance could significantly delay the actualization of housing 
insecurity arising from abrupt decline in income over several months. Thus, our results might be 
an underestimation of the positive influence of housing assistance that could be better understood 
in future studies that use more frequent assessment (e.g., monthly) of housing problems. This 
measurement issue is likely to arise for other aspects of the social safety net as well, which could 
be incorporated in future studies with larger samples of respondents or a focus on those who are 
eligible for social programs, or close to eligibility cutoffs. 
Our sample is drawn from three counties in the Detroit Metropolitan area, where housing 
assistance programs are separately administered across 30 highly fragmented local PHAs (HUD 
2015b).  We had only a small number of respondents per PHA, so we could not explore the 
effects of living in any specific PHA jurisdiction.  Future studies should examine whether the 
positive relationship between housing assistance receipt and subsequent housing security differs 
according to PHA-level administrative practices, to identify program parameters under PHA 
discretion that can improve the effectiveness of housing assistance programs.  Also, nearly all of 
the housing assistance recipients in our sample lived in Wayne County, where residents are more 
likely to be income-eligible for housing assistance; this means that our results are more likely to 
reflect the case of Wayne County and its specific history of racial residential segregation from 
the suburban areas in surrounding counties.  In a sensitivity analysis not shown here that 
constrained the analytic sample to Wayne County residents only, our results were consistent with 
those shown here, but future studies with larger samples should consider the value of housing 
assistance for those living in more and less advantaged communities.     
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In spite of these limitations, our study documents a link between housing assistance 
receipt and reduced housing insecurity in the years immediately following the Great Recession 
of 2007–09.  Two recent evaluation studies of the housing voucher program and its influence on 
housing insecurity, conducted in 2000–05 (Wood and Rangarajan 2004) and 1998-2003 (Wood 
et al. 2008), captured conditions prior to the Great Recession.  These two experimental studies 
have been widely cited as empirical evidence that housing voucher programs should be expanded 
to reduce housing insecurity among low-income renters (Fischer 2015), and we offer more recent 
empirical evidence that suggests the same protective effect.  Regrettably, there was a dramatic 
reduction of about 100,000 housing vouchers with the 2011 Budget Control Act, and the 
program has only recently started to slowly recover the vouchers lost to this sequestration cut 
(Rice 2015).  Our results provide further empirical support for the continued growth of this 
program.  Our findings are also relevant to recent scholarship that frames housing insecurity, 
including eviction and government inaction to address it, as a cause of poverty (Desmond 2016).  
Previous studies document the many negative consequences of housing insecurity.  During and 
following economic recessions, labor market instability leads to housing instability as income 
shocks and increased volatility in income cause missed rent payments.  Unfortunately, housing 
assistance programs suffered during a period of growing need, when households were exposed to 
very high levels of labor market insecurity.  It is an empirical question whether and to what 
extent housing insecurity among low-income renters that arose in the recent recession 
exacerbated economic inequality in the United States.  The findings of this and other studies 
suggest, however, that housing support programs could potentially mitigate some of the 
pernicious consequences of housing insecurity.  
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Appendix 
Table 2-A1.  Description of Types of Housing Insecurity and Items used to Generate Measures 
Types of housing insecurity Items and coding strategy 
Moved for cost [wave 1] Respondents were first asked: “how long have you lived 
here in this house/apartment?” Among respondents who stayed less 
than 1 year in current home, they were asked: “Did you move 
because you could no longer afford that home?” If respondents 
answered affirmatively, they were coded as having moved for cost. If 
respondents either had not moved in the last 12 months or moved but 
not for cost, they were coded as not having moved for cost.  
[wave 2] Respondents were asked: “Since we last talked to you, how 
many times have you moved?” If respondents were moved more than 
once over follow up, there were asked: “Why did you decide to 
move? Please tell me all that apply.” If respondents chose either 
“could no longer afford the previous home” or “home was foreclosed 
upon,” they were coded as having moved for cost. 
Evicted [wave 1] Respondents were asked: “In the last 12 months, have you 
been evicted at any time?” If respondents answered affirmatively, 
they were coded as having been evicted. 
[wave 2] Respondents were asked: “Since we last talked to you, have 
you been evicted at any time?” If respondents answered affirmatively, 
they were coded as having been evicted. 
Homeless [wave 1] Respondents were asked: “In the last 12 months, have you 
ever been homeless?” If respondents answered affirmatively, they 
were coded as having been evicted. 
[wave 2] Respondents were asked: “Since we last talked to you, have 
you ever been homeless?” If respondents answered affirmatively, 
they were coded as having been evicted. 
Moved in with others  [wave 1] Respondents were asked: “Have you moved in with anyone 
in the last 12 months to share household expenses?” If respondents 
answered affirmatively, they were coded as having moved in with 
others. 
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[wave 2] Respondents were asked: “Since the last time we 
interviewed you, have you moved in with anyone to share or because 
you couldn’t afford your own place?” If respondents answered 
affirmatively, they were coded as having moved in with others. 
Behind on rent/mortgage  [wave 1] Respondents were asked: “In the last 12 months, have you 
ever gotten behind on rent?” If respondents answered affirmatively, 
they were coded as having been behind on rent. 
[wave 2] Renters at follow up were asked: “Since we last talked to 
you”, have you ever gotten behind on rent? If respondents answered 
affirmatively, they were coded as having been behind on 
rent/mortgage. Respondents who became homeowners at follow up 
were first asked: “Do you own this house outright or do you have a 
mortgage or land contract on the property?” For mortgaged 
homeowners, the following question was asked: “Are you paying off 
this loan ahead of schedule, behind schedule, or are your payment 
about on schedule?” If mortgaged homeowner answered they are 
“behind on mortgage,” they were coded as behind on rent/mortgage. 
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Failing the Least Advantaged: Waitlist Preference and Rationing Algorithms 
 
Introduction 
 Federal housing spending as a whole—including the mortgage interest deduction used by 
many taxpayers—intensifies economic inequality by concentrating benefits for those at the 
higher end of income distribution, as researchers have shown (Fischer and Sard 2017; Desmond 
2017; McGinty, Chartoff, and Blumenthal 2015; Dreier 2006).  But decision-making about the 
allocation of limited federal resources for low-income housing programs and how it may affect 
inequality among those who are income eligible has received less attention (except Park, Fertig 
and Metraux 2014; Freeman 2002).  Only one in four households eligible for participation in 
low-income housing programs receives assistance (Joint Center for Housing Studies [JCHS] 
2017).  This raises the questions of what front line decisions distinguish the lucky 25% and how 
this rationing affects stratification among the poor.   
 Public housing agencies (PHAs) have significant discretionary power in administering 
low-income housing programs and they can establish a locally-tailored waitlist preference 
system.  Multiple, hierarchical actors can exert pressure on such agencies that may be evident in 
the operation of waitlist preference systems.  While waitlists have little impact if the waitlist is 
relatively short, many communities have extended waiting periods for federal housing assistance 
(JCHS 2017), and thus they serve as an important mechanism of resource allocation of limited 
federal housing resources.  Local housing agencies regularly purge applicants from the waitlist if 
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they are unreachable when attempts are made to check their continued interest in and verify their 
eligibility status for program participation (US Department of Housing and Urban Development 
[HUD] 2001).  Those who cannot be reached may be removed from the waitlist, even if their 
inaccessibility is due to housing instability they may be experiencing.  While rationing of scarce 
housing assistance resources may be necessary, if it is random and not tied to this contact 
procedure, it would not punish the most vulnerable individuals on the waitlist.  However, the 
more systematic rationing based on each of contact could reproduce and reinforce stratification 
amongst the poor by shifting assistance resources away from those who may need them most.
 This study presents a comprehensive conceptual framework that incorporates both local 
discretion in program implementation and an algorithm of rationing to advance our 
understanding of the distributional outcomes of federal low-income housing programs.  By 
analyzing the administrative plans that local housing agencies in Michigan use to administer the 
HCV program, I create three types of waitlist preference systems, with a particular focus on how 
waitlist preference systems facilitate the rationing process.  This study documents two dominant 
forms of waitlist preference systems that promote the selective attrition of applicants 
experiencing residential instability.  Qualitative interviews of PHA directors in the Detroit 
metropolitan area revealed multiple pathways leading to those dominant forms of waitlist 
preference systems.  Analysis of data from the American Community Survey suggests that PHAs 
may be disadvantaging applicants in deep poverty (defined as less than 50% of the federal 
poverty line, FPL) compared to income-eligible applicants with higher income, by increasing the 





TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE MODEL OF FEDERAL WELFARE RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
 Previous studies have revealed how politics and economic incentives embedded in the 
social service program could shape behaviors of implementing agencies to reinforce economic 
inequality among the poor.  Devolution of authority in program implementation, or the 
delegating of discretionary power to lower governmental units, makes implementing agencies a 
critical actor in shaping the distributional outcomes of federally provided public assistance.  A 
line of research has suggested that the devolution of authority in federal welfare programs 
invokes political competition among lower governmental units in a way that reduces welfare 
benefits.  For example, states compete with each other to limit benefits in order to prevent 
welfare migration to their state (Allard and Danziger 2000; Levine and Zimmerman 1999).   
 Another line of research focusing on what is known as “street-level bureaucracy” has 
characterized on the discretionary power that implementing agencies have in program 
implementation, with implications for benefit access and receipt (Brodkin 2010).  They have 
documented how economic incentives embedded in the program actually constrain increased 
discretionary power of implementing agencies, often resulting in the shift of benefit distribution 
away from the least advantaged clients (Spitzmueller 2016; Gray, Dean, Agllias, Howard, and 
Schubert 2015; Lindhorst and Padgett 2005).  For example, when the administrative burden of 
exempting recipients from certain program requirements is high, workers are less likely to use 
exemption rules (Lindhorst and Padgett 2005).  Also, the rule of financial reimbursement for 
service provision, such as the fee-for-service model, which pays service providers for each 
service performed, leads non-profit organizations administering programs for the state to prefer 
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clients with less severe problems, because they are more easily and quickly resolved 
(Spitzmueller 2016). 
 A series of technical reports contracted by Department of Housing and Urban 
Development have also illuminated one important area under PHA’s discretion that could 
influence who receives limited housing assistance: how to organize their waitlists and on the 
basis of which priorities (McCarthy and Brick 2012; NLIHC 2004; Devine et al. 2000).  Meeting 
the preference criteria can significantly reduce waiting time and thus, makes it more likely to 
receive housing assistance for those with priority placement on the waitlist.  However, these 
studies have thus far provided crude estimates of the prevalence of waitlist preference items used 
by PHAs, rather than characterizing a more comprehensive waitlist preference system, which 
makes it hard to predict the final distributional outcome.1  Previous studies also provide a limited 
understanding of how multiple actors with varying incentives characterizes the process of 
establishing waitlist preferences.  I will use a theoretical framework used in the broader studies 
discussed before on the political and economic contexts of program administration by front line 
agencies for this study.  Building on this, I further uncover a rationing process to develop a 
comprehensive conceptual framework of federal housing resource allocation (see FIGURE.  
Lipsky’s work on the implications of what street-level bureaucrats do in shaping benefit access 
and distribution also highlighted that potential program participants are rationed before they 
receive benefits.  He suggests that a rationing system can reproduce social inequalities by 
promoting a higher level of attrition from the waitlist among the least advantaged (Lipsky [1980] 
2010).  In the context of the extended period of waiting time for housing assistance, it is  
                                                 
1. PHAs can establish multiple waitlist preferences and assign different weights for each preference. Examining how 
differently weighted, multiple waitlist preferences within a PHA compete with each other—as I do in this analysis—




FIGURE 3-1. Illustration of the Process of Housing Resource Allocation 
 
important to understand how rationing algorithms in low-income housing programs could shape 
the chance of receiving housing assistance among income-eligible households for program 
participation.  
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXTS OF THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE HCV PROGRAM 
 Various laws have given and taken away discretionary power in implementing federal 
low-income housing programs at the local level.  U.S. Public Law 96-153 (1979) and U.S. Public 
Law 98-181 (1983) both constrained the local discretion of PHAs by establishing a federal 
preference system that prioritized applicants living in substandard housing, involuntarily 
displaced families, and those who were severely cost-burdened.  After passage of these laws, 
local PHAs could make housing assistance available to “families without a Federal preference 
before Federal preference-holders,” but only “for up to 10 percent of the families initially 
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receiving assistance in any one-year period” (Fed. Reg. 53, no. 10 [January 1988]: 1125).  Ten 
years later the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act (QHWRA) dramatically increased 
local discretion in tenant selection within the income targeting requirement, which requires local 
PHAs to allocate 75 percent of their newly issued vouchers to applicants whose household 
income is below 30 percent of Area Median Income.  Local PHAs had the option to develop 
local waitlist preferences, or they could use the preexisting federal preference system. Research 
just after the initiation of the QHWRA (Devine et al. 2000; NLIHC 2004) and a decade later 
(McCarthy and Brick 2012) showed that fewer than half of local PHAs in the United States were 
using any of the three federal preference criteria, and fewer than a fifth were prioritizing those 
living in substandard housing (including those who were homeless).  PHAs seemed to be less 
willing to use the federally defined preferences over time (Devine 2000; McCarthy and Brick 
2012). 
The Administrative Geography and Local Politics of Program Implementation 
 Federal regulation does not geographically constrain applicants to their local PHAs when 
they apply for the HCV program, and does not limit the number of times they can apply.  Thus, 
most people are likely to apply for the HCV program multiple times through multiple local 
PHAs to increase their chance of getting on the waitlist.  This means that the pool of applicants 
and those on the waitlist are not necessarily residents of a given PHA’s local municipality.  
Elected officials with political incentives to serve local voters might want to use that resource 
exclusively for their local residents (Howell-Moroney 2008; Feiock 2009; Hendrick and Shi 
2015; Allard 2017) since the HCV program could be a valuable resource for local municipalities 
to address local affordable housing needs.  Local municipalities can seek to make sure that 
housing vouchers go to local residents either by directly instructing PHAs to prefer local 
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residents or by appointing an executive director and board members to the local PHA who make 
this a priority.  Federal regulation gives local municipalities the status of planners in identifying 
housing and community development priorities and requires local PHAs to consult with them, 
which enables them to pressure local PHAs to support municipal aims.  Thus, local PHAs have a 
high probability of developing a locally exclusive preference system which prioritizes those who 
reside in the jurisdiction of local municipalities.  
Financial Constraints in HCV Program Administration  
 Federal regulations of HCV administration emphasize public participation as a way to 
assess and satisfy local housing needs by requiring a public hearing on the PHA plan and 
opportunities for public comment on the plan (24 CFR 4.903 [2016]).  Social justice advocates 
described this provision in optimistic terms when it was adopted (Bryson and Lindsey 1999; 
Martin and Stern 2004), but local non-profits typically have limited advocacy capacity to 
participate in the local decision making process (Hasenfeld and Garrow 2012; Mosley 2012).  
Although some national non-profits have worked with the US Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) to develop a resolution that encourages local PHAs to better accommodate 
economically marginalized applicants, these initiatives might also have little impact on HCV 
administration at the local level, and may not influence waitlist preference systems.  The first 
reason is that PHAs do not have enough resources to implement the remedies HUD prescribes.  
PHAs are currently receiving only 69 percent of administrative fees for which they are eligible 
(Council of Large Public Housing Authorities 2013), and this severe underfunding for program 
implementation could limit PHA capacity to redesign the implementation of low-income housing 
programs according to HUD’s recommendations.  The other reason has to do with the funding 
formula. HUD contracts the HCV program annually and thus allocates resources on an ongoing 
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basis.  However, rather than tying funding to a PHA’s level of cooperation with HUD’s 
recommendations, the program ties it to the number of vouchers a program issued in the 
preceding year.  PHAs can serve a greater number of people if they fund the moderately poor 
than if they fund the extremely poor, because the amount of support is based on income, making 
the extremely poor more expensive per person to fund.  Funding more moderately poor 
applicants (at a lower amount per beneficiary) will in turn increase the funding amount the PHA 
is awarded in the next cycle (CLPHA 2013; Rice 2013).  Thus renewal of previously allocated 
housing vouchers dominates voucher allocation every year (McCarty 2012).  This disconnect 
between the funding, and the federal initiative and the financial disincentive embedded in the 
current funding formula prevents HUD initiatives aimed at decreasing stratification among the 
poor from having an impact in HCV administration. 
Data and Methods     
ADMINISTRATIVE DATA 
 State law enables state and local governments to establish housing authorities to address 
low-income housing needs, including running federal housing programs, if they desire to do so.  
The state of Michigan permits cities, villages, townships, and counties to operate PHAs that 
oversee an HCV program, and thus has 63 local PHAs operating such programs (HUD 2017).2  
Along with 26 other states, Michigan has a state law that enables the establishment of a state 
agency to administer federal housing programs throughout an entire geographic region within the 
                                                 
2. Not all the legally-eligible local governments choose to have a housing authority. The establishment of PHAs 
might have been locally-contingent and subject to local politics surrounding affordable housing. When we consider 
that the early purpose of the PHA was to build and manage public housing stock, PHA establishment within local 
municipalities might have been even more controversial (Sugrue 2014). Since the HCV program was introduced in 
the 1970s, pre-existing PHAs have been able to add HCV administration to their activities and localities could create 
new PHAs for that purpose. 
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state (Sard and Thrope 2016).  In Michigan, local PHAs administer 52.1% of the 58,925 housing 
vouchers and the state agency administers the remainder (HUD 2017).  Most (94.2%) locally 
administered vouchers are distributed in MSAs.  Currently, Michigan’s PHAs each administer 
between 20 and 6,067 vouchers; the median PHA administers 134.  
 In order to assemble a state-wide picture of waitlist preference systems in Michigan, I 
collected HCV administrative plans for 59 local PHAs between March and September 2016.  
Some were available on the internet; the others I requested via email or in an in-person 
interview.3  The remaining four PHAs either refused to provide the document or did not respond 
to the request.  Thus, my collection rate was 92%.  For this study I examined each plan’s chapter 
on tenant selection, examining the waitlist preferences PHAs have adopted, whether there are 
multiple preferences, whether and how they assign relative preference among those preferences, 
and any further sorting criteria for applicants within the same preferred group.  
 Based on the prevalence of each type of waitlist preference, I developed types of waitlist 
preference systems that reflect the presence or non-presence of waitlist preferences and any 
weighting scheme used when a local housing agency has multiple preferences.  I deductively 
created three types of waitlist preference systems and then analyzed each local housing agency’s 
plan in order to classify it within the typology.  I first considered whether local housing agencies 
have developed any preferences to manage their waitlist and created a category of non-
preference system for those not using any preferences in tenant selection.  I then considered 
whether local housing agencies have a locally exclusive preference which prioritizes those who 
reside in their local jurisdiction.  Since this preference can only benefit those who stay in the 
                                                 
3. HUD reporting rules changed to reduce the administrative burden of local housing agencies in 2003 and no 
centralized data deposit is available that might list waitlist preferences for any year since (McCarty and Brick 2012).  
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same local jurisdiction during the extended period it takes to reach the top of the waitlist, this 
could doubly disadvantage residentially mobile applicants who happen to move across the 
boundaries of local jurisdiction.  They could be at greater risk of dropping off the waitlist due to 
the regular purging of those who cannot be contacted by the PHA, but also because of a change 
in their preferred status since they are now living outside the target area.  I call this type a locally 
exclusive preference system, meaning a waitlist preference system that puts geographic 
considerations first. The last waitlist preference system is some other preference system.  This 
means a very low-weighted locally exclusive preference or one that does not expose applicants to 
the risk of losing preference eligibility when they move, but with at least one preference criterion 
that could either increase or decrease the chance of regular and systematic purging based on 
availability to contact.  The analysis of the administrative plans concludes with an examination 
of geographical difference in the preference of each type of waitlist preference systems. 
PHA INTERVIEWS  
 To examine mechanisms of establishing and maintaining waitlist preference systems, I 
conducted convenience sampling for a multiple-case study after stratifying the PHAs in the 
Detroit MSA (N = 21) into three types of waitlist preference systems that I developed from 
administrative data.  The Detroit MSA PHAs provided examples of all three types, such that I 
could interview at least one individual working for a PHA that uses each type.  From among 12 
PHAs with a locally exclusive preference system, I interviewed four PHA directors and two 
HCV program managers.  From among five PHAs with the other preference systems, I 
interviewed three PHA directors.  Among three PHAs with a non-preference system, I 
interviewed one PHA director. Interviews were semi-structured and took approximately one 
hour; I conducted them between January and September 2017.  I conducted 11 interviews in the 
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meeting rooms at the local housing agencies and one on the phone.  I used open-ended questions 
that I developed to examine the local discretion of federal low-income housing programs and 
relationship with key stakeholders, including local municipalities, non-profits, federal agency, 
and other PHAs (see Appendix 3-1). 
 Results from the administrative data confirm that the locally exclusive preference system 
is the most dominant form, which 60% of local PHAs in Detroit MSA adopted.  I first examine 
four PHAs with the theoretically-conforming outcome, a locally exclusive preference system, to 
determine whether the theoretically-predicted mechanism can be observed in each case and 
examine whether there is an alternative way leading to the same outcome.  Then I compare 
PHAs across those with different outcomes.  Developing the codes for analysis was iterative 
process, starting with theoretically informed, preliminary codes and refining these codes to 
reflect heterogeneity in reality (Miles, Huberman and Saldaña 2014).  I used ATLAS.ti for 
coding and analysis. 
Results 
PREVALENCE OF EACH TYPE OF WAITLIST PREFERENCES AMONG PHAS 
 Figure 3-2 shows that 76% of local PHAs in Michigan (45 of 59) report at least one form 
of waitlist preference; those without any preference system order applicants on the waitlist by 
either randomly assigning numbers to applicants or using date and time of complete application.  
 The largest number, 44% of local PHAs (n = 26), have a “residency” preference that 






Data: Author’s own calculation with HCV administrative plans of local PHAs  
Notes: Local PHA can have multiple preferences, so it does not add up to 100 percent. DV = Domestic 
violence survivors 
 
susceptible to HUD inspection to see whether a geographically based preference would unfairly 
benefit some groups whose residential location correlated strongly with their demographic 
characteristics.  Thus, federal regulation of the HCV program restricts local PHAs from setting a 
geographical unit smaller than the city or county (HUD 2001).  
 Some waitlist preferences facilitate reentry into housing assistance for individuals who 
were previously terminated from assistance due to insufficient funding, for example.  As Figure 
3-2 reflects, 29% of local PHAs have a preference for those terminated from the program due to 
insufficient funding (n = 17).  Almost a quarter, 24%, of local PHAs have an “employment” 
preference for applicants with paying jobs (n = 14).  These preferences vary in terms of 
minimum working hours per week (from 10 hours to 30 hours per week), length of employment 
FIGURE 3-2. Prevalence of Waitlist Preference Items among PHAs in Michigan (N=59) 
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(30 days to 6 months), or minimum annual income.  Federal regulation requires PHAs with an 
employment preference to also have preferences for those who cannot work due to disability or 
age.  About 22% of local PHAs have a preference for those displaced due to a federally declared 
disaster, government action, or public housing demolition (n = 13).  Most limit this preference 
eligibility to residents of local municipalities or those they are serving with other types of 
housing assistance.  Some need-based waitlist preferences target specific demographic groups, 
including the homeless, domestic violence survivors, households with high rent burdens, and 
households with children who face relationship disruption for lack of housing support.  Only 
17% of local PHAs have a preference for homeless applicants (n = 10).  Fourteen percent of local 
PHAs have a preference for domestic violence survivors who lack resources to obtain permanent 
housing.  Two local PHAs have a preference for those paying more than 50% of their income in 
rent, and two local PHAs have a preference for families with children whose lack of housing 
poses a relationship disruption to them.  The veteran preference that 14% of local PHAs use 
applies only to those who are honorably discharged from the military (n = 8).  Another 5% of 
local PHAs have a preference for families with dependents (n = 3). 
DEVELOPING A TYPE OF WAITLIST PREFERENCE SYSTEMS 
 Almost a quarter, or 24%, of the PHA plans (n = 14) have a non-preference system. 
Assignment on the waitlist is completely random for these agencies.  To sort out the preference 
systems of the remaining 45 PHAs, I considered first whether they have a residency preference, 
and then if they have multiple preferences, I considered how they weight them compared to 
others.  Among the 42% (n = 25) with a locally exclusive preference system, nine had a 
residency preference only and the other 16 heavily weighted a residency preference over other 
preferences (n = 16). 
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 When local housing agencies with a residency preference have multiple preferences, each 
local housing agency differs in how they assign points for those eligible for a residency 
preference compared to other preferences (equally weighted versus differently weighted) and 
whether they allow applicants to accumulate points from multiple preferences (cumulative versus 
non-cumulative).  I have classified them as a locally exclusive if they place all the local residents 
ahead of those outside of their local jurisdiction or if they prioritize local residents over 
nonresidents among those otherwise similarly preferred.  Among six local PHAs with a 
differently weighted, non-cumulative system, five give top priority to applicants who are eligible 
for a residency preference.  I classified all these housing agencies as locally exclusive.  The 
remaining PHA gives a residency preference the least weight, and therefore I classified it as 
other preference system.  The next highest impact of a residency preference occurs when it has 
stratifying effects within groups.  If a residency preference is used in the cumulative preference 
system, it has a stratifying effect among those who are in the same preference group regardless 
of the relative points of a residency preference.  All the local housing agencies with a cumulative 
system (n = 6) give differently weighted points for each preference, and five out of six heavily 
weight a residency preference; the remainder gives residency preference lesser weight than any 
other preference.  Although a residency preference with the lowest point benefits local residents 
to a lesser extent than those that heavily weight a residency preference, since the point system is 
cumulative, a residency preference further stratifies those who are in the equally preferred group.  
Thus, I classified all local housing agencies with a cumulative preference system into a locally 
exclusive preference system.  Five agencies that use residency preference give it the smallest 




FIGURE 3-3. Prevalence of Each Typology of Waitlist Preference System, Overall and Stratified by 
Geographical Locations 
Data: Author’s own calculation with HCV administrative plans of local PHAs (N = 59) 
Notes: The percentage adds up to 100 percent for each column. Number in parenthesis indicates the raw 
count of PHAs.   
 
preferences.  This is accomplished through the use of an equally weighted, non-cumulative 
preference system (n = 5). 
 Figure 3-3 presents the prevalence of each typology of waitlist preference systems, both 
overall and stratified by geographical areas.  PHAs in metro areas are less likely to have a non-
preference system than those in nonmetropolitan areas by eight percentage points.  The locally 
exclusive preference system is the most prevalent form of waitlist preference system for both 
metro and nonmetropolitan areas, but PHAs in metro areas are more likely to have this system by 
4 percentage points.  Local housing agencies in metro areas are also more likely to have a 
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general preference system, than those in nonmetropolitan areas, by 4 percentage points. When I 
narrow down to the Detroit MSA PHAs, I find that 60% have a locally exclusive preference 
system. 
MECHANISMS OF ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING WAITLIST PREFERENCE SYSTEMS 
 Theoretical predictions suggest that a PHA’s relationship with a city government will 
lead to a locally exclusive preference system.  Qualitative interviews reveal that the structural 
arrangements connecting local municipalities with local PHAs are much more complicated than 
the ones specified in the state law, city ordinance, and federal regulation, and they differ across 
PHAs.  Four of the local PHAs in the sample are completely independent from a local 
municipality.  Of the other two, one is a department of the city government.  The other is quasi-
dependent in the sense that the city government made the PHA director the head of the 
community and housing department of the city.  Among four PHAs with a locally-exclusive 
preference system, one is part of the city government, one was part of the city government until 
one year before the interview, one is quasi-dependent on the city government, and one is 
completely independent from the city government.  Those I classified as having some other 
preference system or non-preference system are completely independent from a city government. 
 Comparison of PHAs with a locally exclusive preference system reveals multiple 
pathways leading to the same preference system.  Three out of four PHAs established the 
residency preference before the respondents I spoke to had entered their jobs, and thus the 
interviews did not reveal anything about the decision-making process.  The other PHA had 
changed its preference system one year before the respondent joined the PHA.  Data suggests 
that members of the city government directly expressed their opinions in favor of a locally 
exclusive preference system and that this led to its establishment.  Interviews with leaders of the 
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other three PHAs illustrate how a locally-exclusive preference system sustains itself over time 
once it is established.  These leaders suggest that PHAs’ active embrace of implicit city 
intentions, a PHA’s local identity, and passive acceptance of the legitimacy of a residency 
preference in the context of underfunding for the program administration all played critical roles 
in maintaining a residency preference. 
 A PHA executive director said that the residency preference had been added one year 
before he joined the PHA because the city government had objected to the PHA providing 
vouchers to people who were not city residents.  As he said:  
 
When we set the waitlist preference portion that the city, again, we were a part of the city [a 
suburb outside Detroit] at the time, we were seeing a lot of influx of folks from Detroit moving 
up here. They were taking our vouchers, so we weren’t able to serve our own folks. That was why 
that one [residency preference] came… so we could help serve the people of our community first. 
[Instead of] others from outside because people on our own community needed services. 
 
 In the other three PHAs with a locally exclusive preference system in my interview 
sample, the residency preference dated from the inception of the HCV program.  I asked them 
how they understand the residency preference.  One PHA director who was holding a dual 
position in city government as a head of community development answered:     
 
That would get back to probably the community politics. I’m sure the mayor and the city council 
know of low income people in the community and housing is a resource. They want to assist 
persons in their community rather than allowing other residents from Detroit or Ann Arbor [a 
mid-sized city 40 miles from Detroit] apply and receive dollars that were awarded to the housing 
 63 
 
commission of their particular community. So I think that’s part of the rationale that housing 
commissions have is, this is what the city would like us to do.  
 
 When I asked about the history of and rationale for a residency preference, one director 
of a PHA that is a part of the city government commented: 
 
Going back with all my years of experience, because all the federal housing programs were 
established locally, I would say every housing commission had a waitlist preference because 
that’s how you can best serve your residents. If it’s the employees, it’s your employees serving 
your residents. That, especially under the voucher program, has diminished somewhat, and some 
of them let it go, but [the PHA I work for] is very devoted to the residency preference.  
 
This comment suggests that local PHAs that are incorporated into local municipalities and have 
frequent interaction with city officials rationalize that local housing agencies have a mission of 
serving their local residents.  This local identity is, however, also observed among those 
completely independent from a city, pointing out that local administration of the federal program 
itself, regardless of the formal relationship between the PHA and the city, could lead local 
housing agencies to develop a local identity.  This comment from a director of a PHA that does 
not currently have a preference that prioritizes city residents suggests that it would be susceptible 
to perceived wishes of the city government even when it is completely independent from that 
city government:  
 
At least as long as I am director, I would be very open to the opinions of the elected officials 
because they are the elected official. What I have seen in the two mayoral terms I’ve been a part 
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of, I’ve not seen much interest in that [administration of low-income housing programs]. We’re 
just low priority.  
 
In other words, if city officials intervened to try to establish waitlist preference to benefit their 
local residents, they would succeed.  Unlike the theoretical prediction discussed early, which 
would lead to the assumption that cities prefer to use federal housing vouchers exclusively to 
benefit their constituents, my interviews of PHA directors and program administrators reveal that 
some city governments have little interest in PHAs and are therefore unlikely to intervene.  
Variation in interest level might explain the variation in the waitlist preference system.  City 
government officials’ and council members’ interest in the local administration of low-income 
housing programs might also differ from one administration to another.  However, the comment 
of the PHA director who feels his PHA is “low priority” suggests that even without formal 
arrangement with city government, local PHAs without a locally exclusive preference system 
could be susceptible to a city government’s agenda if that government started to become 
interested in the issue.    
 In contrast to those PHAs with a locally exclusive system that actively embrace the city’s 
implicit intention of serving local residents first, an interview with the director of another 
completely independent PHA suggests another mechanism that may maintain the residency 
preference, once adopted. She described the relationship with the city government over her four 
years of employment at the PHA as “hands-off”: “they have not micromanaged…they have not 
influenced our policy at all.”  Yet this PHA has a locally exclusive preference system.  The 
waitlist preference system has been in place since the inception of the HCV program in 1970.  




Those preferences were present when I came in 2012, and when I’ve looked at previous policies, 
it looks like they date back maybe to the inception of the program over here. They’ve been in 
place for a long time. I don’t know whether it was staff who felt that was very important, or 
whether that was the city officials who encouraged our board to adopt that. 
 
She said the system’s legitimacy had never been challenged. Changing the preference system 
would be costly in staff time.  HUD has designated this PHA as troubled due to a failing score 
under the Section 8 Management Assessment Program.  Coupled with HUD underfunding for the 
program administration, this designation means their primary concern is about meeting the HUD 
requirement rather than going beyond the requirement.  Constrained by HUD underfunding for 
the program administration, the PHA is less willing to take any action to re-evaluate the 
legitimacy of waitlist preference and go through the process of changing the waitlist preference 
system, even though doing so might eventually reduce the administrative burden of maintaining 
the residency preference.  
 When asked about underfunding for the program administration, PHA directors 
mentioned that it has a significant impact on the implementation of low-income housing 
programs.  Regardless of which preference system a PHA holds, PHA directors acknowledged 
that underfunding for the program administration effectively shifts administrative practice, 
especially what is prioritized.  Specifically, they said that following program requirements 
receives top priority, including annual recertification of voucher recipients, and that they avoid 
any activities not essential for organizational survival.  One PHA director explained that budget 




…to do more with less, so you spread the workload amongst fewer employees. It makes it more 
difficult to—every person who’s on the program, so for us 800-plus families, we have to re-
certify every family annually. I have three full-time caseworkers, and I have a Section 8 [HCV] 
manager who also still carries a portion of the caseload herself. Ideally, I’d rather her not have 
any caseload so that she could attend strictly to management functions.  
 
Thus, program underfunding freezes managerial functions, which overlap with program areas 
under local discretion, including setting up or revisiting whether the waitlist preference system 
conforms to HUD’s goals.  Another interviewee described revising a waitlist preference through 
timely assessment of local affordable housing needs as a low priority in the context of 
underfunding.  One PHA director said: “We’ve really tried to focus our energies on making sure 
that we’re doing things right, that we’re following the regulations in the program administration 
before we take on anything too creative by adding more preferences.”  Financial constraints were 
the source of this limitation, but “doing things right” refers to following regulations, not 
necessarily serving the most vulnerable.  Another PHA director described the stakes of this:  
 
If we don’t manage a program within the federal guidelines and according to the federal 
regulations, we put our program at risk of being taken back by HUD. We’re really very, very 
diligent to manage our program within those guidelines.  
 
 The type of preference systems did not predict this sense that program underfunding 
forces respondents to make revising the waitlist preference system lower priority.  Although 
having a residency preference, increases the chance of being under surveillance by the federal 
agency and residency preference itself requires an additional burden of verifying preference 
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eligibility status, a residency preference overrides program underfunding, meaning underfunding 
for the program administration did not prevent the establishment or facilitate revisiting the 
legitimacy of a locally exclusive preference system to reduce administrative burden.  Rather, the 
four PHAs with a locally exclusive preference system embraced it either actively at least 
passively.  Among those without a residency preference, the primary reason for not having one 
was a lack of interest from the city government, not underfunding for the program 
administration.  However, this was not the case for other preferences and program underfunding 
provides a rationale for not creating another preference that must be administered.     
 Local PHAs respond differently to other stakeholders’ interest in the preference system 
because of program underfunding.  In order to examine local PHAs’ response to other 
stakeholders’ interest in the distributional outcome of federal housing vouchers, I first asked 
about participation of local non-profits in shaping the administration of low-income housing 
programs.  None of the interview respondents recalled encountering non-profits in the public 
hearings their agencies regularly hold to inform and solicit comments on the local administration 
of low-income housing programs.  Along with underfunding causing diminished staff resources 
to create a preference system, this could explain why some PHAs do not have any waitlist 
preference system.  A lack of encounters with local non-profits advocating for their clients for 
housing assistance prevented me from examining how local PHAs might respond to such 
advocacy.  On the other hand, the federal agency’s attempt to establish a waitlist preference for 
the homeless against the backdrop of the federal initiative to end homelessness provides a unique 
opportunity to examine what local PHAs take into consideration when they consider establishing 
a waitlist preference. 
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 When asked how they perceive the federal initiative to end homelessness and how it 
influenced the way they administer low-income housing programs, particularly the HCV 
program, all of the PHA directors and HCV program managers I interviewed expressed 
agreement with the initiative and said that they were seeking to accommodate more homeless 
applicants through the HCV program.  However, their plans show that their waitlist preference 
systems do not favor the homeless.  Among 22 PHAs in the Detroit metropolitan area, only one 
has a preference for homeless applicants, which allocates a fixed number of vouchers (n = 200) 
to applicants who are referred from local agencies serving the homeless.  When asked about 
using a waitlist preference to accommodate more homeless applicants, five PHA directors 
mentioned that establishing, maintaining, and certifying a new waitlist preference requires a 
lengthy administrative process that they would not like to undertake.  One of them explained: 
 
We were concerned about the administrative burden of adding a new preference to the voucher 
program, because what that would mean is we would need to contact all of those people, all those 
3,000 people on the waitlist, tell them what our new preference is, and ask them if they qualified. 
It just seemed, at that particular time when we wanted to help the homeless, we just didn’t have 
the administrative capacity to be able to add that preference to our voucher program. 
  
Another PHA described concern over potential fraud and the administrative burden of 
verification, and the risk of sanction from HUD if they failed to prevent abuse:  
 
It leaves a lot of room for a family or a person to abuse the system. One could claim 
homelessness to work their way up the waiting list whether it’s true or not. I mean it’s left to the 
housing authority to somehow certify that that person is or is not homeless. That in and of itself is 
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a tremendous administrative burden that makes it very difficult to use the waiting list preference 
as a tool to end homelessness.  
 
Reducing the administrative burden of maintaining a waitlist preference seems to be a necessary 
condition for its establishment.  The Detroit MSA PHA with a homeless preference collaborates 
with local non-profits that serve the homeless who help them verify eligibility, which reduces the 
administrative burden and, likely, the chance of fraud.  Other preferences that PHAs use, such as 
local status, advanced age, and disability status all have the advantage of having a set of official 
documentation attached to it, such as a utility bill bearing the individual’s name or proof of 
social security eligibility. 
Conclusion 
 Using the comprehensive model of federal resource allocation that I developed in the 
literature review, I have examined how local agencies implementing the Housing Choice 
Voucher program use their discretion to initially place applications on the waitlist based on their 
priorities, and how rationing occurs in the extended waiting period.  I have examined two 
important local discretion related to the process of resource allocation: waitlist preferences and 
rationing algorithms.  Local housing agencies have a universal rationing algorithm that regularly 
purges applicants from the waitlist who fail to respond to the PHA’s inquiry about their 
continued interest in and eligibility for program participation.  PHA directors suggest that a 
substantial number of applicants are removed from the waitlist through this process and identify 
a residential move as one of the critical reasons for the non-response to the PHA’s attempts to 




Unlike this standardized process of regular purging of applicants from the waitlist if they 
fail to respond to contact attempts, PHAs show more variation in how they use their discretion in 
initially placing applicants on the waitlist.  Combinations of Locally-varying waitlist preferences 
across PHAs with a  more universal rationing algorithm that is based on contact procedure could 
result in the different types of resource allocation systems.  However, regardless of waitlist 
preferences that particular PHAs hold, all these PHAs have a rationing algorithm that increases 
the chance of attrition among applicants who are residentially mobile.  Moreover, 44% of local 
housing agencies in Michigan have a preference that could penalize those who move far enough 
that they cross the boundary and leave the local municipality where a PHA is located.  Thus, two 
critical components that characterizes resource allocation processes in the HCV program, 
rationing algorithms and waitlist preferences, disadvantage applicants who are residentially 
mobile.   
Unlike the previous research that examines how frontline agencies implementing social 
service programs use their discretionary power to benefit their preferred group, the 
administrative practice of maintaining waitlists and their potential impact on the allocation of 
housing resources do not result from a PHA’s intention to exclusively benefit those who are 
residentially stable.  Rationing based on the contact procedure could actually be neutral when a 
waitlist is short.  In the context of an extended waiting period, however, the seemingly neutral 
and fair process of rationing based on the contact procedure creates a de facto preference for 
those who have the capacity of staying in place or those who have resources to keep PHAs 
updated on their residential address.  Residentially stable applicants are also likely to benefit 
from a residency preference.  A residency preference is the byproduct of local implementation of 
low-income housing programs, which makes them prone to a city’s intention to exclusively 
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benefit its local residents.  Long waitlists effectively differentiates those who only reside in the 
local municipality in the relatively short term from those who stay for a long time, and 
residentially mobile applicants that move across local jurisdiction are less likely to benefit from 
this most dominant waitlist preference.  
The qualitative interviews that were part of this study focused on PHAs in the Detroit 
metropolitan area, and thus, it is plausible that the mechanisms of establishing and maintaining 
each type of waitlist preference systems identified are not applicable to those in nonmetropolitan 
areas or in other states.  Thus, future study needs to examine how the geographical location and 
political, economic, and historical context of PHAs influence their ways of establishing and 
maintaining waitlist preference systems, and how these in turn affect residents and inequality 
among the eligible.       




Appendix 3-A1. Interview Questions 
About PHA 
1. “Could you describe the organizational missions of your housing commission?” 
2. “How do you define the local jurisdiction of your housing commission?”  
3. The relation of city and housing commission:  
a. “Is there any formal or informal communication channel or committee?” 
b. “Who is the primary contact person or department in city government?”  
c. “Any financial support from the municipalities in the HCV administration or the 
function of PHA in general?” 
4. “Could you describe any work by housing commission related to the federal initiative to 
end homelessness?” 
5. About yourself as a director of housing commission 
a. “How long have you been in this position?” 
b. “What was your immediate prior position to the executive director?”  
c. “In general, what is your career background?” 
 
About the HCV program  
1. The perception of discretionary power in the HCV administration: “how much and what 
kinds of discretion do you have in the HCV administration?” 
2. “Could you describe and explain about local preference in tenant selection?” 
a. “What type of local preference do you have?” 
b. “Do you know how those local preferences have come into being?” 
c. “What do you think the rationale for establishing those local preferences?” 
d. “Any recent change in local preference you are aware of?” 
3.  “What are the characteristics of housing needs in the jurisdiction of your housing 
commission?”  
a. “Who should receive housing assistance with a high priority?” 
4. “Are there any possible ways that the public can engage in the HCV administration?” 
a. “Any interaction with the non-profits in the HCV administration?” 
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Failing the Least Advantaged: Residential Mobility among the Poor 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that the HCV program could disadvantage 
applicants who are residentially mobile by increasing their chance of being purged from the 
waitlist and also losing preference eligibility that is often based on residing in the locality of the 
PHA at which they have applied.  Scholars have paid much attention to the causes and 
consequences of residential instability among the poor while explicitly or implicitly comparing 
them to the non-poor (Geller and Curtis 2018; Murphey, Bandy, and Moore 2012; Rossi 1980).  
However, we have limited understanding of residential mobility among the poor and its 
implications for the receipt of housing assistance.  In this chapter, I will examine whether there is 
a difference in residential mobility across income levels, and even among those who are income 
eligible for program participation.  Literature Review 
RATIONING ALGORITHMS AND RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY  
 In HCV programs around the country wait times for a voucher are long, averaging two 
years before the receipt of housing assistance (JCHS 2017).  Worse, local housing agencies are 
known to shelve their voucher programs and cease to offer any new vouchers when they foresee 
a federal budget cut, in order to avoid suddenly terminating those they are currently serving. 
 Additionally, attrition from the waitlist and thus loss of eligibility can happen in at least 
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two ways.  First, applicants have to re-certify their eligibility to apply for the program when they 
get to the top of the waitlist (HUD 2001).  If the applicant’s household income temporarily 
improves between the time of applying and the time at which they reach the top of the waitlist, 
they may become ineligible for a housing voucher without actually ceasing to need it.  Second, 
non-response to mail can lead to removal from the waitlist (HUD 2001).  Other assistance 
programs like the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program reinstate applicants upon 
reverification, but federal housing assistance programs require a new application, and a return to 
the end of the waitlist.  In spite of the enormous value of HCV vouchers, applicants have little 
incentive to maintain a current address with the program because of their uncertainty about ever 
benefiting, given these long waitlists.  Applicants who have sought assistance from multiple 
housing agencies have an even larger burden of keeping their address up to date.    
RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY AMONG THE POOR  
 If residentially mobile applicants on the waitlist are more likely to experience attrition 
over the extended period of waiting time, significant differences in residential mobility amongst 
applicants on the waitlist could determine the allocation of limited vouchers.  Scholars have 
documented that residential mobility is common among the poor while comparing the 
presumably homogeneous group of low-income people to the non-poor (Geller and Curtis 2018; 
Murphey, Bandy, and Moore 2012; Rossi 1980).  Recent research, however, documents 
difference in economic hardship amongst the poor (Shaefer and Edin 2013), pointing to the 
possibility that difference in economic resources amongst the poor leads to differences in 
residential instability.  Economic resources can absorb life shocks that require unexpected 
expenses, including health-related costs, and prevent delaying rent payments or more severe 
forms of housing insecurity, including eviction.  The percentage of household income dedicated 
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to rent is an important indicator of a household’s resilience to life shocks.  The higher the share 
of household income put toward rent, the fewer remaining resources to absorb life shocks.  
Eighty-three percent of very low-income renters were cost-burdened, meaning they are paying 
more than 30% of their income toward rent (Joint Center for Housing Studies 2017).  The higher 
percentage of cost-burdened households at the lower end of income distribution among those 
income eligible for program participation suggests that more economically marginalized are 
more likely to be forced to move when they experience income and life shocks.  This means that 
they are less likely to benefit from HCV programs because of the way this will increase their 
attrition from the waitlist.            
 
Data and Methods 
 To examine who has an increased chance of being removed from the list due to having 
relocated residential move, I estimate residential mobility in a single year period amongst those 
eligible for program participation using the five-year microdata from the American Community 
Survey that combines previously released single-year data from 2012 to 2016.  The American 
Community Survey is a nationally representative sample of American households. It also 
provides state-level estimates of residential mobility, and thus, captures the pool of income-
eligible applicants who are likely to go through waitlist preference systems in Michigan.  The 
data includes information on whether respondents moved in a given one-year period, as well as 
moving distance.6  l have limited my sample to householders aged 18 or older who have been 
                                                 
6. American Community Survey provides information on Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA). PUMA follows the 
boundaries of county groups, single counties, or census-defined “places,” If these areas exceed 200,000 residents, they 
are divided into as many PUMAs of 100,000+ residents as possible. 
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residing in Michigan for at least 12 months (N = 44,126).  I have excluded those who are 
currently residing in Michigan but migrated to Michigan in the last 12 months (N = 1,569) since 
their originating place does not have enough cases to conduct a statistical analysis. 
 I first conduct a bivariate analysis to examine whether respondents who move (hereafter 
referred to as “movers”) have different characteristics from those who did not move in the last 12 
months (hereafter referred to as “stayers”).  Next, I conduct a logistic regression model to predict 
whether respondents moved in the last 12 months, separately for the overall sample and 
metropolitan only sample, since a large number of locally administered vouchers goes into 
metropolitan areas.  To examine who is more likely to move across cities and therefore likely to 
be purged in a locally exclusive preference system, I create the outcome variable combining 
information on whether respondents moved or not in the last 12 months and if moved, whether 
their origin and destination Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA) is different.  This results in the 
three outcome categories that include: stayers, those who moved, but within the same PUMA 
(hereafter referred to as “within PUMA movers”), and those who moved across PUMA 
(hereafter referred to as “across PUMA movers”).  I conducted a multinomial analysis to 
examine what factors distinguish within PUMA and across PUMA movers from stayers.  
 I use a set of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of respondents as a control 
variable in multivariate analysis.  This data includes five years of American Community Survey 
data annually collected and it is possible that each categorical group of income-to-needs ratio 
differently reflects year-to-year variation in the frequency of moving.  If the category of below 
100% of federal poverty level disproportionately includes a year when residential mobility was 
relatively unstable compared to other years in the sample, the result could simply reflect the 
yearly variation in moving.  This would be the same for controlling for place of residence one 
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year ago.  Thus, I use a year and place fixed effect model that incorporates interview years and 
places as categorical variables.  
Results  
 In this section, I examine difference in residential mobility across income levels, 
particularly focusing on difference among those who are income-eligible for program 
participation.  PHA directors identified residential mobility among the applicants as one of the 
critical mechanisms of rationing in the extended waiting period.  Relatively little incentive to 
report to local PHAs when they move due to uncertainty in ever receiving housing assistance 
makes it less likely for applicants to keep in touch with local PHAs once they move.  Thus, the 
extended waiting time can create disparity in the chance of receiving housing assistance between 
those who are residentially mobile and those who are not.   If levels of residential mobility 
among applicants were not tied to economic hardship, however, rationing would not be an 
important mechanism of resource allocation in the context of economic inequality.  On the other 
hand, if applicants experiencing more severe hardship are more likely to move over time and 
have a higher chance of being rationed from the waitlist than those who are income-eligible, but 
with higher income, this could result in reproducing and reinforcing pre-existing economic 
inequality among the poor.  
 Another way that residential mobility is related to the distributional outcome of housing 
assistance is change in preference eligibility status according to geographically bounded 
preferences.  For example, applicants who lack the ability to stay in place long enough to cover 
an extended waiting time may not be eligible for a residency preference in the same city at the 
end of their waiting time as at the beginning.  In order to capture this, I further stratify types of 
residential mobility beyond whether respondents in the American Community Survey moved or 
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not to include whether they moved within the Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA) or across 
PUMA.   
 Table 4-1 presents characteristics of the sample overall in the first column and then 
compares the characteristics of stayers (householders who stayed in the same house in the last 12 
months) in the fifth column with those of movers overall (see second column) and stratified by 
whether they moved within PUMA to another PUMA.  I present p-values for t-tests of 
differences between groups, with significance denoted with asterisks and stayers as the reference 
group.  Among householders aged more than 18 years old currently residing in Michigan in the 
sample, 24.8% moved at least once in the last 12 months (18.3% within PUMA versus 6.6% 
across PUMAs).  Movers are more likely to have household income below 50% of the federal 
poverty line than stayers (17.2% versus 13.3%), and less likely to have household income above 
300% of the federal poverty line than stayers (22.8% versus 24.9%).  Those who moved within 
the PUMA are more likely to have household income less than 100% of the FPL (both less than 
50% of the FPL and 50%−100% of the FPL) and less likely to have household income more than 
200% of the FPL (both 200%−300% of the FPL and more than 300% of the FPL).  Those who 
moved across PUMAs are more likely to have household income less than 50% of the FPL 
compared to stayers, but they are also more likely to have household income more than 300% of 
the FPL compared to stayers.  Moreover, those who moved across PUMAs are less likely to be in 
the near poverty (100%−125% of the FPL) and the low-income group (125%−200% of the FPL) 
compared to stayers.   
 Racial and ethnic characteristics also differ between movers and stayers, although 
subtypes of moves did not show differential patterns.  Compared to stayers, movers are more 
likely to be Non-Hispanic White (64.6% versus 61.5%), less likely to be Non-Hispanic Black  
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TABLE 4-1.  Population-Weighted Characteristics of Householders aged 18 years or older who are 
currently residing in Michigan from the American Community Survey (2012-16), Overall and Stratified 










Number of Observations 42557 10563 7769 2794 31994 
Movers (%) 24.8 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Moved within PUMA (%) 18.3 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Moved across PUMA (%) 6.6 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Stayers (%) 75.2 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Income to Needs Ratio (%)      
< 50% of FPL 14.4 17.2*** 17.6*** 15.8** 13.3 
50%-100% of FPL 17.9 18.5 19.3* 16.0 17.7 
100%-125% of FPL 7.8 7.5 7.9 6.4* 8.0 
125%-200% of FPL  18.6 17.8 18.7 15.2*** 18.9 
200%-300% of FPL 17.0 16.2 15.8* 17.6 17.2 
> 300% of FPL 24.3 22.8*** 20.7*** 29.0*** 24.9 
Race and Hispanic Origin      
Non-Hispanic White 62.4 64.6*** 62.2 71.6*** 61.5 
Non-Hispanic Black 26.9 24.2*** 25.9** 19.2*** 27.9 
Non-Hispanic all other races 5.8 6.5** 6.6* 6.3 5.6 
Hispanic 3.4 3.2 3.6 1.9*** 3.4 
Age       
18-34 35.0 53.1*** 51.0*** 59.4*** 28.2 
35-54 35.4 29.4*** 30.9*** 24.8*** 37.6 
55 and older 29.6 17.5*** 18.1*** 15.9*** 34.2 
Household type      
Married couple 20.5 16.6*** 16.5*** 16.8*** 22.0 
Cohabiting couple 10.2 13.9*** 13.4*** 15.6*** 8.8 
Single-male 26.9 27.9* 27.2 30.1** 26.5 
Single-female 42.4 41.6 43.0 37.5*** 42.7 
Presence of Own Children Under 18 36.3 34.8** 37.9 26.1*** 36.9 
Demographic Events 6.6 9.3*** 9.5*** 8.6*** 5.5 
Education      
Less than high school 12.9 10.5*** 11.3*** 8.0*** 13.9 
High school graduate equivalent 28.8 25.2*** 26.9*** 20.1*** 30.1 
Some college or associate degree 38.1 42.9*** 43.5*** 41.1*** 36.4 
Bachelor’s degree or higher 20.1 21.4** 18.3* 30.7***  19.7 
Notes: Using t-tests, I examined whether differences in these characteristics between stayers and movers 
(or those who moved within/across PUMA) are statistically significant. Federal poverty line is 
 83 
 
separately calculated for each year. Demographic events include having child birth, divorce, 
widow, or marriage in the past year.  





(24.2% versus 27.9%), and more likely to be Non-Hispanic all other races (6.5% versus 5.6%).  
Movers are more likely to be young compared to stayers (53.1% versus 28.2%) and less likely to 
be age of 35−54 and 55 and older.  Movers are less likely to be married (16.6% versus 22.0%) 
compared to stayers, and more likely to be a cohabiting couple (13.9% versus 8.8%) or single 
male (27.9% versus 26.5%).  Movers are less likely to have a child under 18 of their own 
compared to stayers (34.8% versus 36.9%).  Movers are more likely to have experienced 
demographic events, including child birth, divorce, widow, or marriage in the past year.  
Compared to stayers, movers are less likely to have education less than high school (10.5% 
versus 13.9%) or high school graduate equivalent (25.2% versus 30.1%).  Movers are more 
likely to have some college experience or associate degree compared to stayers (42.9% versus 
36.4%) and more likely to have bachelor’s degree or higher compared to stayers (21.4% versus 
19.7%).  Thus, staying tends to correlate with socioeconomic advantage.  
 Table 4-2 presents results from the logistic regression models predicting whether 
respondents have moved in the last 12 months.  The first two columns are odds ratio and 95% 
confidence interval for coefficients of variables using the overall sample that includes both those 
residing in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas.  The last two columns are odds ratio and 
95% confidence interval for coefficients of variables using only metropolitan sample.  All the 
models control for a set of variables of socioeconomic status and controlled for years and places.  
In the overall sample, householders whose household income is below 50% of the FPL are more  
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TABLE 4-2.  A Logistic Regression Model Predicting Residential Move in the last 12 months using the 
American Community Survey (2012-16) 
 Overall sample  Metropolitan sample 
 OR 95% CI  OR 95% CI 
Income to Needs Ratio 
(ref. = 125%-200% of FPL) 
  
   
< 50% of FPL 1.12* 1.01, 1.24  1.17** 1.05, 1.31 
50%-100% of FPL 1.09 0.99, 1.20  1.14* 1.02, 1.27 
100%-125% of FPL 0.99 0.87, 1.12  1.03 0.89, 1.18 
200%-300% of FPL 0.98 0.89, 1.08  1.01 0.91, 1.13 
> 300% of FPL 0.98 0.89, 1.08  0.98 0.89, 1.09 
Number of Observations 42557  33904 
Notes: The analytic model above includes all demographic and socioeconomic variables provided in the 
descriptive analysis and controls year that respondents were interviewed and PUMA where 





likely to move than those whose household income is between 125% and 200% of the FPL by a 
factor of 1.12 odds (< .05).  In the metropolitan sample only, both householders whose 
household income is below 50% of the FPL and those whose household income is between 50% 
and 100% of the FPL are more likely to move compared to those whose household income is 
between 125% and 200% of the FPL. 
 Table 4-3 presents results from the multinomial regression models that further specify 
moving outcome by combining information on whether respondents moved or not and whether 
they moved within PUMA or across PUMAs.  These models are separately estimated for the 
overall sample and metropolitan sample only.  For each sample, the first two columns are Odds 
Ratio (OR) and 95 percent confidence interval (95% CI) of coefficients of variables in a model 
with an outcome of moved within PUMA (or moved across PUMAs) versus those who stayed.  
In the overall sample, compared to the result from the logistic regression model with an outcome  
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TABLE 4-3.  A Multinomial Regression Model Predicting Residential Move in the last 12 months using 
the American Community Survey (2012-16) 
 Overall sample 
 Moved within PUMA  
(vs. Stayed) 
 Moved across PUMA  
(vs. Stayed) 
 OR 95% CI  OR 95% CI 
Income to Needs Ratio 
(ref. = 125%-200% of FPL) 
  
   
< 50% of FPL 1.07 0.95, 1.19  1.30** 1.09, 1.55 
50%-100% of FPL 1.06 0.95, 1.18  1.19 0.99, 1.42 
100%-125% of FPL 0.98 0.86, 1.12  1.01 0.80, 1.28 
200%-300% of FPL 0.93 0.83, 1.04  1.16 0.97, 1.38 
  > 300% of FPL 0.91 0.82, 1.02  1.21* 1.02, 1.43 
Number of Observations 42557 
 Metropolitan sample only 
 
Moved within PUMA  
(vs. Stayed) 
 Moved across PUMA  
(vs. Stayed) 
 OR 95% CI  OR 95% CI 
Income to Needs Ratio 
(ref. = 125%-200% of FPL) 
     
< 50% of FPL 1.12 0.99, 1.26  1.38** 1.14, 1.70 
50%-100% of FPL 1.10 0.98, 1.23  1.30* 1.06, 1.59 
100%-125% of FPL 1.00 0.86, 1.16  1.13 0.87, 1.48 
200%-300% of FPL 0.95 0.84, 1.07  1.25* 1.02, 1.52 
  > 300% of FPL  0.91 0.81, 1.02  1.25* 1.03, 1.50 
Number of Observations 33904 
Notes: The analytic model above includes all demographic and socioeconomic variables provided in the 
descriptive analysis and controls year that respondents were interviewed and PUMA where 





that only considers whether respondents moved or not, the result from the multinomial logistic 
regression model suggests that householders whose household income is below 50% of the FPL 
are only more likely to move across PUMA rather than staying in the same place (OR = 1.30, p < 
.01) compared to those whose household income falls between 125% and 200% of the FPL, but 
this was not the case for within-PUMA movers.  Also, households whose household income is 
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more than 300% of the FPL are more likely to move versus stay in the same place (OR = 1.30, p 
< .05) than those whose household income falls between 125% and 200% of the FPL. 
Results from the metropolitan-only sample show similar findings: compared to 
householders whose household income falls between 125% and 200% of the FPL, no categories 
in income-to-needs ratio present statistically significant differences in the odds ratio of moved 
within PUMA versus stayed.  Also, both householders whose income is below 50% of the FPL 
(OR = 1.38, p < .01) and above 300% of the FPL (OR = 1.25, p < .05) are more likely to move 
across PUMAs than those who stay in the same place in the last year compared to the reference 
group.  Moreover, both householders whose income is between 50% and 100% of the FPL (OR 
= 1.30, p < .05) and 200% and 300% of the FPL (OR = 1.25, p < .05) are more likely to move 
across PUMAs than those who stay in the same place in the last year, compared to the reference 
group. 
 For a sensitivity analysis, I investigate whether the health of householders is associated 
with whether respondents moved in the last 12 months.  It is plausible that mental and physical 
health conditions explain the association between income and residential mobility, but the results 
remained the same after controlling for health conditions of respondents.   
Discussion 
 Results suggest that residentially mobile people are less likely to benefit from the current 
low-income housing programs.  Then I examined whether levels of residential mobility differ 
across income levels especially among those who are income-eligible for program participation.  
Analyses of American Community Survey data reveal a higher residential mobility among those 
with less income, which implies current low-income housing programs could be reproducing and 
reinforcing inequality by shifting limited federal housing resources away from the least 
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advantaged.  Thus, PHAs need to reconsider the algorithms of rationing in the context of 
differential residential mobility amongst people who are eligible for program participation.  
Since rationing depends on the length of time on the waiting list, local PHAs can consider 
shorter waitlist to reduce attrition rate.  Also, local PHAs can predict those who are highly likely 
to move and develop a strategy to keep them on the list.  Although removal of applicants from 
the waitlist can be an important mechanism of allocating limited housing resources, attrition can 
occur at multiple stages in the local administration of the HCV program.  For example, some 
people who lack the resources to submit an online application for housing assistance could be 
eliminated from consideration before even being able to apply.  Thus, future study needs to 
examine how attrition occurs at multiple stages in program implementation and its implication 
for resource allocation.       
 Future research can also develop a more precise measurement of residential mobility in 
the context of attrition from waitlist of federal low-income housing programs that capture the 
number of moves rather than whether respondents moved or not in a given time period.  
Applicants who move multiple times during the extended period of waiting time are more likely 
to be purged from the waitlist by not updating their residential address to local PHAs.  
 Despite these limitations, this study contributes to the literature on residential mobility 
and economic inequality by documenting difference in the prevalence of residential mobility 
amongst low-income people and examining the consequences of residential mobility in the 
context of the distribution of limited federal housing resources.  This study reveals how waitlist 
preference and rationing systems in low-income housing programs can disadvantage those who 
are highly mobile.  Residential mobility amongst the poor can take the form of involuntary 
moves, which could be a traumatic experience, and thus, re-establishing connections with 
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welfare agencies and going through re-certification processes could increase the cost of claiming 
and receiving benefits.  Residential instability and benefit distribution would be, however, most 
pronounced in low-income housing programs because of lower incentive to update their address 
with local housing agencies.  However, residential instability can also influence the take-up rate 
of other benefits.  The intersection of residential mobility amongst the poor and the continuity of 
welfare benefits will be a fruitful venue for future studies, which can provide insight into how 
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Social work scholars and practitioners have recognized the importance of securing 
housing as a critical component in intervention to stabilize the service trajectory of homeless 
clients (Padgett, Henwood, and Tsemberis 2016).  More broadly, recent studies have documented 
that those who are at risk of being homeless, including domestic violence survivors and welfare-
involved families, could benefit from cross-system coordination between low-income housing 
and social service systems (Fowler and Chavira 2014; Fowler, Taylor and Rufa 2011).  However, 
housing assistance programs are not entitlement in the U.S. and only limited resources are 
available even for those who are eligible to receive federal housing assistance.  In the long term, 
it is critical to increase funding for low-income housing programs even in the context of budget 
cuts.  In the short term, it is critical to ask the question of whether and how those resources could 
be effectively used.  In my dissertation project, I conducted (a) an econometric evaluation of the 
effectiveness of low-income housing programs in reducing housing insecurity and (b) a study of 
the local implementation of low-income housing programs, particularly as it relates to who 
receives housing assistance amongst those eligible for program participation and its social 
implication.      
In Chapter II, I conducted a propensity score analysis and results suggest that receiving 
housing assistance significantly reduces the chance of experiencing housing insecurity over 
follow up compared to income eligible people, but do not receive housing assistance.  Thus, 
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housing assistance programs are an effective tool in reducing housing insecurity.  In Chapters III 
and IV, I asked the question of who receives housing assistance while highlighting the role of 
local housing agency, which is the critical actor in the decision making process of resource 
allocation in the context of devolution of authority in program implementation.  Policy outcomes 
depend significantly on the decision making of front-line agencies implementing low-income 
housing programs after the Housing Quality and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, which 
relegated a great deal of authority for program implementation to local public housing 
authorities.  Local control, though, can pose challenges.  With limited resources, local level 
housing agencies may engage in discretionary practices and shape benefit access and distribution 
in ways that are not equitable.  In Chapter III, I examined how local housing agencies in 
Michigan use their discretion in program implementation related to waitlist preference and 
rationing algorithms.  The administrative plans local housing agencies in Michigan use to 
administer the Housing Choice Voucher program reveal two dominant forms of waitlist 
preference systems that promote the greater loss of applicants who are experiencing residential 
instability.  In Chapter IV, I juxtaposed this finding with the American Community Survey 
results suggests that low-income housing programs increase the likelihood that they will purge 
applicants in deep poverty, rather than income-eligible applicants with higher incomes, from the 
waitlist.  I argue that current low-income housing programs preserve and even deepen economic 
stratification amongst the poor by shifting limited federal housing resources away from the least 
advantaged. 
  My dissertation project that examines the intersection of low-income housing programs 
and poverty informs future studies to frame housing policies and programs as an anti-poverty 
tool and suggests that it is critical to examine the effectiveness of low-income housing programs 
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in addressing poverty particularly focusing on the role of local implementing agencies.  Two 
lines of poverty research suggest that contemporary processes of poverty reproduction cannot be 
fully understood at an individual level and point toward the limits of poverty policies that heavily 
rely on strategies of workforce development.  First, contextual analyses of poverty have 
illuminated how urban economic restructuring and racial segregation have shaped the current 
geographical landscape of poverty, which, in turn, influences the life chances of individuals in 
urban, low-income communities.  Second, poverty scholars have documented the prevalence of 
residential instability among the poor.  Residential instability cumulatively disadvantages the 
poor, with a multifaceted impact on the lives of low-income children and their families, affecting 
health, school, and labor market outcomes.  Housing policy can intervene in this process by 
promoting upward economic and residential mobility and reducing residential instability.  Thus, 
future studies need to examine multiple areas under the discretionary power of local housing 
agencies in program implementation and how front line decision making about those areas might 
influence the effectiveness of low-income housing programs in addressing poverty.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
